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If presumption of innocence is the golden thread of criminal law, then right to remedy 
weaves to the heart of civil action: if there is a right, there should be a remedy (ubi ius, ibi 
remedium).1  While remedy may take diverse forms, damages are probably the most 
common and the most sought after form of remedy in private law.  To an ordinary litigant, 
his primary concern is unlikely to be what the law is, but rather what damages he will be 
able to get if he were successful.  Thus, not surprisingly, the law of damages attracts 
significant attention in private law.  Yet surprisingly, damages in public law have, until 
recently, been neglected.  Compensation for actual loss aside, the courts have 
conventionally regarded a declaration as a sufficient remedy to vindicate the wrong done to 
an aggrieved claimant,2 and on occasions were even hostile to the idea of damages in public 
law, as if the interest and concern of a claimant is completely transformed as soon as he 
embarks on a public law claim.3  The claimant is no longer treated as a victim but a publicly-
spirited citizen who would be satisfied by putting the wrong to an end.  As a result, 
damages, if ever awarded, are normally of a relatively modest level, if not nominal, and little 
attention has been given to the principles governing the award.   
 
In recent years, the question of damages for vindication of constitutional right has 
received increasing attention in different common law jurisdictions.  It is a controversial 
subject, an understanding of which is obfuscated by the loose usage of the terms “damages” 
and “vindication”.   There are different types of damages – compensatory damages, 
restitutionary damages, performance damages, disgorgement damages, general damages, 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, aggravated damages, exemplary damages, nominal 
damages and so on.   In general, with the exception of exemplary damages and nominal 
damages, all other forms of damages are loss-based or gain-based.  They are awarded 
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1
 Ashby v White (1703) 2 Ld Raym 938, at 953, per Holt CJ: “If a plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a 
means to vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and indeed 
it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal.” 
2
 Anufrijeva v Southwark LBC [2004] QB 1124, per Lord Woolf.  See also R (Greenfield) v SOSHD [2005] 1 WLR 
673, at [19]; R (Faulkner) v SOSJ [2013] 2 AC 254, at [29].  
3
 For example, Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB). 
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primarily upon proof of loss or gain.  In this paper they are categorically regarded as 
“compensatory damages” (including restitutionary damages).  The concern of this paper is 
less about compensatory damages, which are dependent on evidence and are often readily 
available whatever cause of action is successfully pursued, but whether a claimant would be 
entitled to a further and additional amount of non-pecuniary damages, widely known as 
vindicatory damages, for the violation of his constitutional rights.  If so, what is the rationale 
and principles to guide the award and the assessment of such damages?  Should there be an 
autonomous approach to damages in public law, or should the court attempt to seek 
equivalence with private law?  It is not surprising that different jurisdictions have developed 
different approaches to these questions.  Some jurisdictions have adopted an autonomous 
approach so that constitutional remedies are developed independently of tort remedies.  
Others have adopted a parallel approach but argued that development in public law should 
be informed by principles in private law.  Meanwhile, certain jurisdictions have queried the 
utility of developing constitutional damages when common law damages are adequate to 
provide a just and appropriate remedy, and instead of relying on development in 
constitutional remedies, it was contended that an expansion of the common law principles 
would be the preferred route.  
 
In considering these issues, it is inevitable that we will have to grapple with the 
controversial divide between public law and private law.  A rigid distinction is untenable, but 
its complete obliteration is equally unrealistic.  When human rights are protected by 
constitutions or Bills of Rights, there is no doubt that a public law dimension, given 
governance and systemic issues at stake.  This is pertinent in those jurisdictions where the 
courts have powers to strike down legislative encroachment or when the issues involve 
redistribution of social benefits.  Public interest must play an important role in fashioning 
any appropriate remedy.  At the same time, human rights are about individual rights, so 
therefore a constitutional claim will predictably have a private law dimension of recovery of 
damages suffered by the victim.  While a human rights claim is made in public law, no court 
would have ignored the human rights dimension in supervising the exercise of public law 
power.4  Hence, it would be artificial to adopt a mutually exclusive approach to the 
public/private law divide and to assign the role of the courts in a strictly public/private 
dimension.5 
 
In offering his superb analysis, Geoff McLay perceptively asked these questions: “If 
damages ought to be provided in a constitutional action, what extra value does such an 
award add to the compensation provided by the common law?  [Conversely], if the common 
law is to be expanded to award remedies where constitutional remedies might already 
apply, what is the value such an extension might have over the direct employment of the 
constitutional instrument.”6   This article argues that vindicatory damages deserves a proper 
place in public law, and in assessing vindicatory damages in public law, the approach has to 
be that a violation of constitutional rights is in itself an independent wrong.  While there are 
shared objectives between damages in public law and some torts, there are also significant 
differences between a tort claim and a public law claim so that it is preferable to develop 
                                                     
4
 Compare: Jason Varuhas, “The Development of the Damages Remedy under the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990: From Torts to Administrative Law” [2016] New Zealand Law Review 213-254. 
5
 In this paper, the terms “a constitutional law claim” and “a human rights claim” are used interchangeably. 
6
 Geoff McLay, “Tort and Constitutional Damages: Towards a Framework” [2012] Public Law 45-60, at 60. 
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the two actions independently.  It is further argued that vindicatory damages should be 
confined to public law, whereas exemplary damages, which would available in the common 
law, should not be available in public law.  Section 1 of the paper sets out the background 
on the right to an effective remedy.   Section 2 provides a comparative survey of the 
approaches to vindicatory damages in different jurisdictions.  It is argued that, 
notwithstanding some initial differences, there is an emerging trend of convergence 
towards a composite approach to vindicatory damages in a constitutional claim.  Finally, in 
Section 3, the article attempts to address some of the objections to the award of vindicatory 
damages.  It challenges the argument that tort law would provide a more generous or 
coherent approach to damages in public law.  Among other things, it is argued that, stripped 
of semantic differences, there is no real objection to the award of vindicatory damages in 
public law.   
 
1. The Right to Effective Remedies 
 
1.1 The Emergence of Human Rights 
 
One of the most dramatic legal developments after the Second World War was the 
emergence of human rights, at both global and domestic levels.  The unanimous adoption of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 led to the introduction of the two 
International Bills of Rights, and inspired a number of regional human rights treaties.  
Human rights provisions appeared in numerous domestic constitutions or Bills of Rights.  
These rights have been described as “fundamental”, “inalienable”, or “self-evident”, and are 
based on the inherent dignity and worth of the human person.7  The constitutional nature of 
these rights usually means that they enjoy a higher or entrenched status in domestic law.  A 
restriction of these rights is subject to intense scrutiny both as to their legality as well as 
their proportionality.  While these rights are originally framed as a negative restraint on 
States’ powers, it is now generally accepted that they also impose positive obligations on 
the States.8  When there is a violation of these fundamental rights, there is usually an 
obligation on the States, imposed by international treaties or domestic constitutions/Bills of 
Rights, to provide effective remedies to the victim.9  Enforcement of these constitutional 
rights in domestic law usually falls within the realm of public law.10 
 
 
1.2 Just and Appropriate Remedies 
 
                                                     
7
 See, for example, the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
8
 These obligations have been described as an obligation to respect, to protect, and to promote: See General 
Comment No 19, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee, paras 43-51, UN Doc No. E/C.12/GC/19 
(2008). 
9
 A right to effective remedy is expressly provided in Art 2 of the ICCPR, Art 13 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, whereas the court is empowered to grant appropriate and just remedy under s 24 of the 
Canadian Charter and  6 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance,  
10
 There were unsuccessful attempts to argue that a violation of a domestic Bill of Rights could give rise to a 
tortious action of breach of statutory duty in Hong Kong and New Zealand: see, for example, Ho Chee Shing 
James v Secretary for Justice [2015] 4 HKLRD 311 (HK), Simpson v Attorney General [1994] NZLR 667(NZ) and R 
(Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 WLR 673 (UK).  See further below.  
 4 
While the right to remedies is formulated differently, according to the respective 
constitutional instrument, a common theme is that the remedies have to be effective, which 
in turn means that they have to be just and appropriate in the circumstances.  Thus, Art 2 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) requires a member State to 
ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms are violated shall have an effective 
remedy.  The Human Rights Committee has time and time again emphasized the central 
importance of the availability of effective remedies, including compensation, for the 
violation of the rights affirmed by the ICCPR.11  The Committee attaches special importance 
to State Parties’ establishing appropriate judicial mechanisms for addressing claims of rights 
violations under domestic law, and it has been said that, without appropriate reparation, 
the obligation to provide effective remedy is not discharged.12  Reparation could take many 
different forms, and will generally entail appropriate compensation.13  Damages are 
routinely awarded by international tribunals, although they are typically not of a substantial 
amount and the principles on which the damages are assessed are seldom set out.14  
Likewise, the right to effective remedies before a national authority is expressly recognized 
in Art 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights.  Art 41 further provides that the 
European Court of Human Rights shall afford just satisfaction to the injured party if the 
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be 
made.   In other words, Art 41 affords just satisfaction at the international level, and such 
just satisfaction is accorded on the premises that domestic remedies are insufficient.  The 
primary obligation to afford and develop effective remedies still lies with the State parties.  
A similar emphasis on reparation has been made by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights.  In Velasquez v Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court held:15 
 
“It is a principle of international law, which jurisprudence has considered ‘even a 
general principle of law’, that every violation of an international obligation which 
results in harm creates a duty to make adequate reparation.  Compensation, on the 
other hand, is the most usual way of doing so.” 
 
The right to effective remedies has found its way into many domestic constitutions 
or Bills of Rights.  For instance, s 24(1) of the Canadian Charter provides that anyone whose 
rights or freedoms under the Charter have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of 
competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in 
the circumstances.16  Although there is no express reference to a right to remedy under the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights, the New Zealand Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have 
recognized a positive duty under the ICCPR to provide effective and adequate remedies for 
a breach of the Bill of Rights in domestic law. Otherwise, the fundamental rights and 
                                                     
11
 See, for example, Mbenge v Zaire, Communication No 16/1977, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2, at 76 (1990), Selected 
Decisions, vol 2, p 76; Acosta v Uruguay, Communication No 110/1981, UN Doc Supp No 40 (A/39/40), at 169 
(1984), Selected Decisions, vol 2, p 148; Valenzuela v Peru, Communication No 309/1988, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/48/D/309/1988 (1993). 
12
 General Comment No 31, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add 13 (2004), at [15] &[16]. 
13
 Ibid, [16]. 
14
 See Tipping J, in Taunoa v Attorney General [2008] 1 NZLR 419, at [300]. 
15
 (1990) 11 Human Rights Law Journal 127, at 129, [25] 
16
 A similar principle to grant effective remedy that is  “appropriate and just in the circumstances” exists in s 6 
of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance; s 8(1) of the UK Human Rights Act; s 6 of the Constitution of Trinidad 
and Tobago, and many other constitutions. 
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freedoms that are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights would become, as Cooke P remarked, “a 
hollow shell”.17   
 
A few observations could be made.  First, the right to effective remedies is a 
fundamental right at both the international and the domestic levels.  The primary duty to 
provide effective remedies lies with the State party, so any remedy to be granted by an 
international tribunal is only of a supplementary and secondary nature, which is to afford 
just satisfaction to the victim when remedies granted at domestic level are insufficient.  
There is nothing to suggest that a domestic court could not grant remedies that exceed 
what is required at the international level, as international human rights instruments are to 
set the minimum and not the maximum standards.  Indeed, it is expressly provided in Art 
5(2) of the ICCPR that no restriction of any fundamental rights recognized in any State party 
could be made on the premises that such rights are recognized to a lesser extent by the 
ICCPR. 
 
Secondly, it follows that the primary obligation to develop effective remedies lies 
with the State party at the domestic level.  The overarching requirement is that the remedy 
has to be effective.  To be effective, the remedy has to be just and appropriate in the 
circumstances.  To be just, the remedies have to address the extent of injury to the rights or 
their underlying interests, and be commensurate with the importance and significance of 
these rights in the domestic legal system.  The courts have to be entrusted with broad 
discretion to decide what constitutes effective remedies, including damages.  Any a priori 
restriction of the discretion as to what type of remedies can be granted would likely be 
contradictory to the very concept of effective remedies.  A remedy will be just if it 
adequately compensates and vindicates the injury to the constitutional rights, whereas 
whether it is appropriate will depend on the purposes the remedy is to serve and the 
availability of other remedies.  Save as to these general principles, international law does 
not prescribe the remedies to be provided at domestic law.  Given that different 
jurisdictions may have developed their own procedural and evidential requirements for 
remedies, this is likely to be an area that an international court would afford a wide margin 
of appreciation to the States. 
 
Thirdly, it is trite to suggest that a constitution must receive a broad, generous and 
purposive interpretation.  When the right to remedies is enshrined as a constitutional right, 
whether expressly or by implication, the court enjoys an unfettered discretion, or indeed an 
obligation to fashion and, if necessary, to create a new remedy to redress a violation of 
constitutional rights.18  As De la Bastide CJ observed, in the context of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, that “given the breadth of this power, it is not readily 
apparent to me why in making an order for payment of damages as a consequence of a 
breach of a constitutional right, the court should be either: (a) limited in providing 
compensation for the injured party or (b) bound necessarily by the rules which govern the 
assessment of damages (including exemplary damages) at common law.”19  
                                                     
17
 Simpson v Attorney General [1994] 3 NZLR 667, at [19]; Taunua v Attorney General [2008] 1 NZLR 419, at 
[106]. 
18
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security (1997) 3 SA 786 (CA), at [69], per Ackermann J; Jorsingh v Attorney 
General [1997] 3 LRC 333, at 344, per Sharma JA. 
19
 Jorsingh v Attorney General [1997] 3 LRC 333, at 338 (CA).  
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2. Responses to Vindicatory Damages in Different Jurisdictions 
 
In many jurisdictions, the award of constitutional damages is still a novel, albeit 
controversial, area of development.  Apart from diverse legal, social, economic and political 
tradition of each jurisdiction, the approach that is adopted may also depend on varied 
judicial perceptions of the functions of constitutional damages.  The discussion is further 
obscured by the absence of a common understanding of the meaning of the term.  In the 
first place, at a general level, it can be said that all remedies, public or private, are 
vindicatory or intend to serve the purpose of vindication.20  This general meaning does not 
take the discussion too far, as the fact that all remedies serve a vindicatory purpose do not 
prevent the emergence of different remedies.  The real issues are: (1) what does vindication 
in public law mean; (2) what purposes do vindicatory damages serve; (3) whether such 
purposes would have been served by existing remedies so that a new head of vindicatory 
damage is redundant; and (4) how to assess vindicatory damages and how they are different 
from the assessment of common law damages. 
 
2.1 The Case for Vindicatory Damages in Public Law 
 
The case of vindicatory damages rests on the intrinsic value of the constitutional rights 
itself.  In this sense, vindication or vindicatory damages in public law has a more narrow and 
specific meaning.  They refer to a distinct category of damages in public law to recognize the 
intrinsic worth of a constitutional right, and are distinguished from a range of damages in 
private law that may serve a vindicatory purpose.  It is true that many constitutional rights 
have their origin in the common law and have long been protected under it.  Yet these rights 
are recognized to be so fundamental that they are put in a constitution of higher authority 
under which the State is under an obligation to respect and to protect.  If their violation 
attracts no more than the damages that are already available under the common law, would 
this not render the constitutional protection of these rights into nothing but rhetoric?  It 
would be “a strange state if relatively innocuous common law breaches were compensated 
as of right whereas breaches of a constitutionally affirmed human right of an important kind 
were deemed less worthy of compensatory redress.”21  As Tippling J pointed out, there are 
two victims in a violation of a constitutional right – the particular victim of the breach and 
the public generally (impairing public confidence in the efficacy of constitutional 
protection).  Public law vindication is not about vindicating the right of the victim as such 
but about vindicating the overall right of the public by reaffirming the primacy of 
constitutional rights.22  Similarly, as observed by the Canadian Supreme Court, vindicatory 
damages are to recognize “that Charter rights must be maintained, and cannot be allowed 
to be whittled away by attrition.”23  Meanwhile, violations of constitutional rights “impair 
                                                     
20
 See, for example, Andrew Burrows, “Damages and Rights”, in Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson (eds), 
Rights in Private Law (Hart Publishing 2012,) 275-307, at 304. 
21
 See Tipping J in Taunoa v Attorney General [2008] 1 NZLR 429, at [318]. 
22
 Ibid.  Also see Mallon J in Liston-Lloyd v The Commissioner of Police [2015] NZHC 2614, at [42]-[43]. 
23
 At [25] 
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public confidence and diminish public faith in the efficacy of the protection”.24  Hence, 
“while one may speak of vindication as underlining the seriousness of the harm done to the 
claimant, vindication as an object of constitutional damages focuses on the harm the 
Charter breach causes to the state and to society.”25  Thus, vindication has to be understood 
in this narrow public law sense as opposed to a general meaning of vindicating a right. A 
different way of putting it is that vindication has both public and private law components.   
As Professor Jenny Steele pointed out, vindication could mean “vindication of the claimant’s 
right for the claimant’s benefit, or vindication of the right itself, for the purpose of securing 
that right in the public interest.”26 Constitutional damages are primarily concerned with the 
latter meaning of vindication.  
 
Accordingly, in a public law claim, the claimant is compensated not just as the victim 
as in the private law proceeding, but also as a citizen possessing a right which has intrinsic 
value in itself.  As Thomas J observed, “compensation for a breach of the Bill of Rights 
therefore embraces the extra dimension of vindicating the plaintiff’s right, a right which has 
been vested with an intrinsic value, and it is that intrinsic value to the plaintiff for which he 
or she must be compensated over and above the damages which the common law torts 
have traditionally attracted.  Thus, the right has a real value to the recidivist offender as well 
as to a model citizen.”27 
 
Therefore, vindicatory damage, if its award is appropriate, is to provide an extra 
damage to vindicate the right of the complainant in the public law sense, as recognized by 
Lord Scott in Merson v Cartwright:28 
 
“If the case is one for an award of damages by way of constitutional redress… the nature 
of the damages awarded may be compensatory but should always be vindicatory and, 
accordingly, the damages may, in an appropriate case, exceed a purely compensatory 
amount… The purpose is to vindicate the right of the complainant, whether a citizen or a 
visitor, to carry on his or her life in the Bahamas free from unjustified executive 
interference, mistreatment or oppression… In some cases a suitable declaration may 
suffice to vindicate the right; in other cases an award of damages, including substantial 
damages, may seem to be necessary.” 
 
Two consequences follow: first, vindicatory damages in public law are an additional 
head of damages.  They do not preclude compensatory damages that would be available.  It 
follows that the mere fact that the claimant has not suffered any personal loss does not 
preclude damages where the objectives of vindication clearly call for an award.  At the same 
time, as a public law remedy, vindicatory damages are discretionary and will be awarded 
only when the remedies taken as a whole, are insufficient to vindicate the rights.  Secondly, 
while the focus of vindication is not punishment, it does share some similarities with 
                                                     
24
 Ibid, quoting from Fose v Minister of Safety and Security, (1997) 3 SA 786 (CC), at [82]. 
25
 At [29]. 
26
 Jenny Steele, “Damages in Tort and under the Human Rights Act: Remedial or Functional Separation?” (2008) 
67(3) Cambridge Law Journal 606-634at 618.  See also Tipping J, in Taunoa v Attorney General [2008] 1 NZLR 
429, at [300]. 
27
 Dunlea v Attorney General [2000] 3 NZLR, at [67]. 
28
 [2005] UKPC 38, at [18]. 
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exemplary damages. The shared objectives mean that it is normally inappropriate to grant 
both vindicatory damages and exemplary damages at the same time.29 
 
Despite its novel nature, vindicatory damages have gradually gained recognition in 
different jurisdictions in recent years, although its justifications and its relations with 
common law damages remain controversial. The United Kingdom remains a notable 
exception. 
 
 
2.2 The Starting Point 
 
A convenient starting point is the decision of the Privy Council in Maharaj v Attorney 
General of Trinidad and Tobago.30  The applicant, a barrister, was imprisoned for seven days 
for contempt of court without being heard before his committal.  He sought redress 
pursuant to section 6 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, which provided the High 
Court the power to “make such orders… as [it] may consider appropriate for the purpose of 
enforcing or securing the enforcement” of the fundamental rights.  The Privy Council held 
that this created a new cause of action in public law against the State directly, and not a 
private claim in tort for which the State was vicariously liable.  Under this new cause of 
action, the court may grant effective redress, including reparation and monetary 
compensation.  Such damages, as Lord Diplock observed, were a claim in public law for 
compensation for deprivation of liberty and not a tort claim of false imprisonment.  
Therefore, the method of assessment of such damages must be distinct from that under the 
law of tort, and “would include any loss of earnings consequent on the imprisonment and 
recompense for the inconvenience and distress suffered by the appellant during 
incarceration.”31  
 
This judgment raised a number of questions, including: What is the nature of a public 
law claim for damages?  Should damages in public law be assessed along tortious principles 
in private law, at least in situations where there is a concurrent claim in public law and tort?  
If not, what are the principles that govern the assessment of public law damages? How 
would they be different from the assessment of private law damages? More specifically, 
should vindicatory damages, in the sense of an additional award other than compensatory 
damages in order to vindicate the constitutional rights being violated, be made in public 
law?  The court referred to loss of earning, which fell within the category of compensatory 
damages, and inconvenience and distress, which might be factors to be considered for 
vindicatory damages. 
 
                                                     
29
 Takitota v Attorney General of the Bahamas [2009] UKPC 12, at [13].  In this case, the claimant was detained 
for 8 years under miserable conditions without resolving his immigration status, but the treatment was not 
high-handed or different from other detainees.  The trial judge considered inappropriate to grant exemplary 
damages. The Privy Council affirmed the award of $100,000 by the Court of Appeal as constitutional or 
vindicatory damages. See also Lumba (Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 245, 
at 321, [238] 
30
 [1978] 2 All ER 670 (PC). 
31
 Ibid, at 680. 
 9 
Some of these issues were addressed by the Privy Council in the subsequent case of 
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Ramanoop, where, in an oft-cited passage, the 
Judicial Committee advised:32 
 
“When exercising the constitutional jurisdiction the court is concerned to uphold, or 
vindicate, the constitutional right which has been contravened.  A declaration by the 
court will articulate the fact of the violation but in most cases more will be required 
than words.  If the person wronged has suffered damage, the court may award him 
compensation.  The comparable common law measure of damages will often be a 
useful guide in assessing the amount of this compensation.  But this measure is no 
more than a guide because the award of compensation under section 14 is 
discretionary and, moreover, the violation of the constitutional right will not always 
be coterminous with the cause of action at law. 
 
An award of compensation will go some distance towards vindicating the infringed 
constitutional right.  How far it goes will depend on the circumstances, but in 
principle it may well not suffice.  The fact that the right violated was a constitutional 
right adds an extra dimension to the wrong.  An additional award, not necessarily of 
substantial size, may be needed to reflect the sense of public outrage, emphasize the 
importance of the constitutional right and the gravity of the breach, and deter 
further breaches.  All these elements have a place in this additional award.  
“Redress” in section 14 is apt to encompass such an award if the court considers it is 
required having regard to all the circumstances.  Although such an award, where 
called for, is likely in most cases to cover much the same ground in financial terms as 
would an award by way of punishment in the strict sense of retribution, punishment 
in the latter sense is not its object.  Accordingly, the expressions ‘punitive damages’ 
or ‘exemplary damages’ are better avoided as descriptions of this type of additional 
award.” (emphasis added) 
 
Lord Nicholls stressed four points.  First, vindication in most cases requires more 
than mere words.  Secondly, constitutional claims are independent of common law tort 
claims.  Thirdly, nonetheless, damages in common law tort claims would provide useful 
guidance.  Finally, the Privy Council referred to an “extra dimension” and an “additional 
award” to reflect the sense of public outrage, emphasize the importance of the 
constitutional right that was violated and the gravity of the breach, and deter future 
breaches.  This discretionary award is vindicatory and not punitive.  These two decisions 
form the basis for the development of vindicatory damages in a number of jurisdictions, 
although unfortunately, the full ambit of Ramanoop is not always appreciated. 
 
 
2.3 Canada 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court has responded to these questions by adopting a sophisticated 
balancing approach that brings together the public law and the private law dimensions in 
                                                     
32
 [2006] 1 AC 328, at [18]-[19]. 
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the award of damages for human rights violations.  In the leading case of Victoria v Ward,33 
the claimant was mistakenly identified as the person who threw a pie at the Prime Minister 
at a public ceremony.  He was wrongfully detained for a few hours and was subject to a strip 
search at the police station. While he was detained, his car was also impounded.   He 
brought an action in tort and an action for breach of his constitutional rights to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure under s 8 of the Canadian Charter. The trial judge awarded 
damages under s 24(1) of the Charter at $5,000 for the strip search and $100 for the seizure 
of his car. These awards were affirmed by the Court of Appeal.  The sole issue before the 
Supreme Court was the proper approach to the assessment of damages under the Charter. 
 
In delivering the judgment of the Court, McLachlin CJ first made a few preliminary 
observations.  First, the court has a broad discretion to grant appropriate and just remedy 
under the Charter.  This discretion cannot be reduced by “casting it in a strait-jacket of 
judicially prescribed conditions”.34  Nor is it possible “to reduce this wide discretion to some 
sort of binding formula for general application in all cases, and it is not for the appellate 
courts to pre-empt or cut down this wide discretion.”35 Secondly, this discretion is not 
unfettered, as what is “appropriate and just” will depend on the facts and circumstances of 
the particular case, and the court will be guided by previous decisions. Thirdly, an 
“appropriate and just” remedy will have to, among other things, “meaningfully vindicate the 
rights and freedoms of the claimants” and “be fair to the party against whom the order is 
made.”36  Lastly, an effective remedy includes the remedy of damages for a violation of 
Charter rights and, given that the award of public law damages is a new endeavor, the court 
should adopt a cautious and incremental approach, whilst bearing in mind that damages are 
just one of the available remedies.37   
 
With these caveats, the Chief Justice emphasized that an action for public law 
damages is a distinct public law action that lies directly against the state for which the state 
is primarily liable, and not a private tort action against individual actors for which the state 
is vicariously liable. In considering whether damages are “appropriate and just” under s 24 
of the Charter, the award must further the general objects of the Charter and focus on the 
violation of constitutional rights as an independent wrong.  It follows, as the Court held, that 
the existence of a concurrent tort claim would not preclude the claimant from obtaining 
public law damages, provided that there was no double recovery. 
 
The Court then introduced a four-step test.  The first step is to establish a breach of 
the Charter.  Step two involves the identification of the purposes of damages.  A functional 
approach to damages is adopted, that is, damages are “appropriate and just” to the extent 
that they serve a useful function or purpose.  In this regard, damages, which are regarded as 
a unique public law remedy, are considered to be capable of serving three inter-related 
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functions: (1) compensation for any personal loss and suffering caused by the violation of 
one’s constitutional rights; such compensation including both personal loss (physical, 
psychological and pecuniary) as well as harm to intangible interests (distress, humiliation, 
embarrassment and anxiety); (2) vindication of the right by affirming its constitutional 
values and importance, as violations of constitutional rights harm not only the victims but 
also “impair public confidence and diminish public faith in the efficacy of the constitutional 
protection”;38 and (3) deterrence in the sense of “regulating government behavior, 
generally, in order to achieve compliance with the Constitution.”39 
 
Even when damages are functionally justified, the court would have to consider any 
countervailing factors in determining whether they are appropriate and just.  At this third 
stage, the burden of establishing these countervailing factors is shifted to the State.  Two 
countervailing factors were identified, namely the existence of alternative remedies and 
concerns for effective governance.  If other remedies, including the availability of a tort 
claim, can adequately meet the need for compensation, vindication and/or deterrence, a 
further award of damages would not be “appropriate and just”.  Damages should also not 
be awarded unless the State conduct meets “a minimum threshold of gravity”. Different 
thresholds may be adopted for different situations.    The Court should take into 
consideration that, on the one hand, government should not be deterred from enforcing the 
law or making policy discretion due to the possibility of future award of damages, and on 
the other hand, state immunity should not be a defence to justify or condone a violation 
that has reached a minimum threshold of gravity.  Thus, a State action pursuant to valid 
statutes that were subsequently declared invalid should generally attract State immunity, 
unless the State conduct is clearly wrong, in bad faith or an abuse of power.40  Likewise, 
malice will be required to defeat state immunity in malicious prosecution because of the 
highly discretionary and quasi-judicial role of prosecutors.41  In this regard, private law 
thresholds and defences may offer guidance, but nothing more than guidance only, on 
whether it is appropriate and just to make an award of damages against the State, bearing 
in mind that the Charter action is a distinct and autonomous action from that under the 
private law.42  
 
Finally, if the State fails to refute that an award for damages is “appropriate and 
just”, the court would then have to assess the quantum of damages.  In general, 
compensation is the most important objective, and vindication and deterrence will only play 
supporting roles.  In determining compensation, which includes both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary loss, tort law may again provide assistance. The purpose is to put the claimant in 
the same position that he would have been had the breach not occurred. In this regard, the 
court would be benefited by considering similar awards in tort.  However, tort law is less 
helpful in determining the quantum for vindication and deterrence.  This is an exercise of 
rationality and proportionality, taking into account the seriousness of the breach, the 
impact of the breach on the claimant, the seriousness of the State misconduct, the public 
interest in good governance, and the need to avoid diverting large sums of funds from 
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public programmes to private interests.   The damages have to be just to both the claimant 
and the State.  While an unduly high amount of damages may have to be avoided, the 
damages have to represent a meaningful response to the seriousness of the breach and the 
objectives of compensation for the wrongs done, upholding Charter values and deterring 
future breaches. 
 
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court in Victoria v Ward affirmed the award 
of $5,000 for the violation of the claimant’s right to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure.  The right was violated in an egregious fashion.  The strip searches were inherently 
humiliating and degrading and constituted a significant injury to his intangible interests.  A 
declaration was insufficient to satisfy the need for compensation.  The State conduct was 
serious and reflected a lack of sensitivity to Charter interest, but it was not intentional, 
malicious, high-handed or oppressive.43  Thus, no substantial damages were required to 
serve the objects of vindication and deterrence.  The court further found that no damages 
were justified for the seizure of the car, as no functional purpose of damages would have 
been served.  A declaration would be sufficient to serve the need for vindication of the right 
and deterrence of future improper car seizures.44 
 
The Ward approach was generally warmly received.45  It provides a comprehensive 
and balanced framework for the determination of damages in public law. There were only a 
handful of damages cases after Ward, where the approach was adopted,46 albeit with some 
isolated comments on its application.47  
 
The Ward approach was recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Henry v British 
Columbia (Attorney General).48  In that case, the claimant was wrongfully convicted and 
imprisoned for almost 27 years as a result of the failure of the prosecution to disclose 
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relevant exculpatory evidence.  He brought a claim for damages in both tort law (negligence 
and malicious prosecution) and the Charter for the breach of the Crown’s constitutional 
disclosure obligations.  At the Supreme Court, it was accepted that there was a breach of 
the claimant’s Charter rights and that an award of damages would serve the function of 
vindication. The only issue was whether the court could award damages against the Crown 
under the Charter for prosecutorial misconduct absent proof of malice. The focus was on 
the third stage of the Ward’s test, namely, whether the prosecution would be able to 
establish countervailing factors against the award of damages.  The Crown argued that a low 
threshold for alleging prosecutorial misconduct would hamper the ability of prosecutors to 
discharge their important public duties with adverse consequences for the administration of 
justice. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that this case was not about a 
highly discretionary prosecutorial discretion to initiate or continue a prosecution, but a 
distinct constitutional obligation to make proper disclosure of relevant information to the 
defendant.  It was unanimous in holding that malice, which was rooted in the tort of 
malicious prosecution, was inappropriate and not required for a constitutional breach of 
wrongful disclosure. The Court, however, split on what the threshold standard would then 
be.  The majority held that the public interest was not well served when Crown counsel 
were motivated by fear of civil liability, and hence the threshold could not be the standard 
of negligence or gross negligence.  It held that the claimant has to show that the Crown 
intentionally withheld relevant information that it knew or ought reasonably to have known 
that the information was material to the defence and that the failure to disclose would likely 
impinge on the accused’s liability to make full answer and defence.  Further, the claimant 
has to show sufficient causation between the wrongful non-disclosure and the harm 
suffered, and this causation was to be established by the “but for” test. The minority, 
comprising the Chief Justice and Karakatsanis J, whilst agreeing that proof of malice was not 
required, held that the proper enquiry was whether the Crown has been able to refute that 
an award of damages were appropriate and just.  As the duty to disclose was a Charter 
obligation and not a discretion, they found that the Crown has failed to show any chilling 
effect on prosecutorial discretion if a claim for damages was recognized.  Referring to 
Canadian’s international obligations under the ICCPR, the minority held that to require proof 
of intention would be “to lower Charter protection below the level of protection founded in 
an international human rights instrument that Canada has ratified.”49  Thus, the claimant 
need not establish fault to justify an award of damages.  While the minority agreed that 
there should be a causal connection between the Charter breach and the loss suffered by 
the claimant, they cast doubt, without deciding, on the appropriateness of the “but for” test 
for causation for this purpose.50  On the appropriateness of awarding damages for 
vindicatory purpose, they held:51 
 
 “An award of Charter damages may also help vindicate the Charter rights that the 
Crown is alleged to have breached in Mr Henry’s case.  As explained in Ward, 
vindication in this context refers to repairing the damage done to the public through 
the state’s violation of Charter rights.  There are few scenarios that can shake the 
public’s confidence in the justice system more deeply than those alleged by Mr 
Henry.  According to the allegations, state action in breach of the Charter seriously 
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undermined the fairness of Mr Henry’s trial and the state subsequently imprisoned 
him for nearly three decades.  In these circumstances, an award of Charter damages 
may help to publicly vindicate such a serious violation of Charter rights.  Such an 
award would recognize the state’s responsibility for the miscarriage of justice that 
occurred in Mr Henry’s case, and the importance of respecting Charter rights in 
order to guarantee trial fairness.” 
 
It has been suggested that individual justice was drowned out by public interest 
concerns in Henry.52  Perhaps the case should be considered in its proper perspective.  
Firstly, the court was unanimous in endorsing the approach in Ward.  Secondly, the tort 
claim of malicious prosecution failed in this case as no malice was proved, and hence no 
damages could have been awarded under the tort approach.  Thus, there is no question that 
the Charter award was lower than the common law tort award.  Thirdly, the court has 
extended the Charter liability to a situation when the tort of malicious prosecution failed, 
and the issue of damages was considered in such context.  Fourthly, damages were 
considered appropriate to fulfill the vindication function, and public interest was taken into 
account as the prosecution argued that a substantial amount of damages would pose 
unjustifiable restraints on prosecutorial discretion.  Had the common law tort been 
available, it would be difficult to see that such consideration would not have been material 
in assessing damages under the tort approach.  On the other hand, the majority in Henry 
created an uncertainty, namely whether the claimant should bear the burden of establishing 
the threshold, which is a departure from the Ward approach where the burden to establish 
countervailing factors rests with the Crown.53  The majority held that this burden was not an 
onerous one, and could be discharged by simply showing that the prosecution was in 
possession of exculpatory evidence and failed to disclose it.54  They also took pains to 
emphasize that the threshold applied only to non-disclosure cases.  Nonetheless, the 
reversed burden of establishing a threshold for Charter damages would create unnecessary 
uncertainty that would have to be clarified in future.  The majority was clearly concerned of 
the implications of awarding damages on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but as the 
minority pointed out, “good governance is strengthened, not undermined, by holding the 
State to account where it fails to meet its Charter obligations.”55  It would be more 
consistent with the Ward approach if it were for the prosecution to establish that the non-
disclosure was not intentional in order to refute a claim for damages.  In this regard, the 
approach of the minority is much to be preferred. 
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Notwithstanding the different approaches to establishing the threshold for refuting 
damages in Henry, which difference should not be over-stated, the Ward test has been 
firmly established in Canada and is a welcome approach.  It provides a pragmatic, flexible 
and balanced approach to damages in a public law claim.  It recognizes that a constitutional 
claim and a tort claim are distinct and parallel legal avenues, and affirms the central 
importance of constitutional rights so that a violation of constitutional rights is treated as an 
independent wrong that is worthy of compensation in its own right, irrespective of whether 
there are losses to the victim.  As the minority in Henry pointed out, “whereas breaches of 
the duty to disclose occur, Charter liability flows from the constitutionally entrenched 
mechanisms that permit individuals to hold the state to account. This is distinct from tort 
liability, which imposes conduct-based thresholds to regulate tortious conduct as between 
individuals.” 56 This right-centred approach will free the court from the constraints of the 
principles of tort law, which is primarily loss-centred.  A distinct approach to public law 
damages enables the court to further develop the principles of awarding damages in public 
law, which will allow an individual to hold the State directly (and not an individual officer) to 
account in a State-individual relationship where it may not be appropriate to extend such 
principles to regulate tortious conduct between private individuals.57  At the same time, it 
recognizes that tort law has an important role to play.  Insofar as assessment of 
compensation is concerned, tort law will provide useful guidance, and there is no reason 
why the two causes of action should lead to different quantum or principles.  This will 
ensure that a comparable amount of compensatory damages would be awarded under the 
Charter and that compensatory damages which is personal in nature would not be reduced 
by public interest consideration.  Different considerations apply in relation to the function of 
vindication and deterrence.  While they are (but not necessarily) the objectives of damages 
for some forms of torts, tortious award should be no more than a guide in this regard, as 
Lord Nicholls had cautioned in Ramanoop, that “the violation of the constitutional right will 
not always be coterminous with the cause of action at law.”58  Infringement of privacy and 
discrimination are notable examples where tort law is not well developed to address the 
wrongs.59 By clearly identifying the functions of damages and separating the function of 
compensation from vindication, it requires the court to direct its mind to different functions 
of damages. By excluding any reference to exemplary damage, and through a careful choice 
of language, the Court has sidestepped the debates surrounding the semantics that had 
plagued this aspect of the law of damages in England.60  Further, the Ward test allows the 
court to explicitly balance the need to vindicate constitutional rights and any countervailing 
factors, with a provision that the burden to establish countervailing factors rests squarely on 
the state.  This approach mirrors the test on constitutional liabilities, under which the 
burden to establish the rationality and proportionality of a restriction on constitutional 
rights rests on the State.  It also allows the court to develop, albeit incrementally, the 
approach to public law damages, in response to any breach of a fundamental right, instead 
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of just closely modelling public law damages on existing private law principles, the 
application of which would have denied any damages in Henry.  
 
The Canadian approach has left a few issues to be determined in future, namely (1) 
the appropriate test for establishing causation in public law damages; (2) whether public law 
damages should be awarded for systemic failures or when the breach was a result of judicial 
failures or legislative encroachment; and (3) the appropriate threshold to counteract an 
award of public law damages, where the threshold has been held to be dependent on the 
facts of each case and the nature of the rights involved. 
 
 
2.4 New Zealand 
 
While the New Zealand Bill of Rights takes the form of an ordinary statute rather than a 
constitution, the New Zealand courts do not treat this as an impediment to adopting the 
principles developed in Maharaj. In that case, the Court held that a violation of the Bill of 
Rights was a separate cause of action in public law for which compensation was available.  
In R v Goodwin, Richardson J first pointed out that the Bill of Rights required a rights-centred 
approach so that primacy should be given to vindicate the human rights.61  Moreover in 
Manga v Attorney General,62 Hammond J clearly distinguished a breach of the Bill of Rights 
from a tort action by emphasizing the public dimension of the former.  In the seminal case 
of Simpson v Attorney General (Baigent’s Case),63 the majority of the Court of Appeal also 
held in favour of a distinct public law claim.  In that case, the claimant’s house was 
mistakenly searched pursuant to a search warrant which contained mistaken information.  
After the claimant has pointed out the mistaken information, the police still insisted on 
searching the house.  The claimant brought various tort claims and a claim under s 21 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights.  The tort claims were unavailable, either because the pleading 
failed to establish malice or bad faith, or that the Crown Immunity Act excluded the 
vicarious liability of the Crown.64  Thus, the Court of Appeal was faced squarely with the 
question about the nature of a Bill of Rights claim.   
 
The Court of Appeal emphasized the constitutional nature and purposes of the Bill of 
Rights, and relied, inter alia, on the ICCPR, which imposes on the State a duty to provide 
effective remedy for violation and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy.65  Relying 
on Maharaj, the Court held that a Bill of Rights claim was an independent cause of action in 
public law against the State, and not one arising from vicarious liability in private law. 
Accordingly, the Crown immunity from tort liability under the Crown Proceedings Act was 
not applicable.  Hardie-Boys J, after surveying the authorities from India, Ireland, the United 
States and Canada, concluded that the Bill of Rights required a rights-centred approach.  
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Fundamental human rights are inherent in and essential to the structure of a society, and a 
primary focus of the court is to provide an appropriate remedy. This rights-centred 
approach does not necessarily require a remedy in the form of damages or other 
compensation, but it should be awarded if it is appropriate and proper to do so.  The 
purpose is compensatory and not punitive.66 It was held that damages were appropriate, as 
while a mere declaration might deter similar official conduct in future against other people, 
this would be of no benefit to the deceased claimant and would be “toothless”.67  Nor 
would the normal remedy of exclusion of evidence be relevant when there was no criminal 
proceeding against the claimant.  The award should, however, be “restraint” or “moderate” 
on the one hand, but it should not trivialize the breach.  
 
Unlike the Canadian approach, the majority of the Court preferred to distance itself 
from tort principles in approaching public law damages.  Cooke P emphasized that the Bill of 
Rights was not a mere platitude of declaration, and was not to be approached “as if it did no 
more than to preserve the status quo”.68 Casey J observed that there would be problems in 
adapting traditional common law remedies such as negligence, trespass, and so on, to 
encompass all the rights and freedoms in the Bill in order to give appropriate redress for 
their infringement.69  McKay J held that whether damages were available would depend on 
the nature of the right and of the particular infringement, and its consequences.  When the 
infringement involved deprivation of liberty or invasion of privacy, monetary compensation 
was likely to be the appropriate remedy.  Damages for false imprisonment or trespass 
should not preclude a separate public law claim, and the same damages might be 
recoverable by either route.70  While not disagreeing with this approach, Gault J, in dissent, 
preferred to develop the remedy in the tort of breach of statutory duty, which was regarded 
as a familiar and more fruitful route than to chart into the unknown sea of public law 
remedies.71   
 
The assessment of damages in a public law claim always has an aspect of 
arbitrariness.  This will be compounded if these damages in public law, at least for those 
wrongs that are analogous to tortious wrongs, would produce different, albeit smaller, 
awards.  This problem was well encapsulated by Daly CJ in Jamakana v Attorney General:72 
 
“The assessment of damages in tort, where one is dealing with non-pecuniary or 
general damages, is an attempt to perform the difficult and artificial task of 
converting into financial terms injury, loss, suffering and deprivation.  As a result a 
number of conventions have been evolved.  In dealing with deprivation of 
constitutional rights one is equally attempting to quantify in financial terms loss of 
liberty, loss of freedom of movement, loss of freedom of expression and so on.  
Some of these losses are closely analogous to tortious wrongs and both categories 
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share the same difficulties of quantification and for that reason alone should share 
similar conventions.  Indeed, the end purpose is the same; recompense for a wrong 
and so the method of quantification should in my view be the same.” 
 
A partial and pragmatic answer to this problem is for the courts to take account of 
the damages that would have been awarded under tort law in assessing public law damages 
so as to ensure an equitable result without double recovery.  Accordingly, Cooke P advised 
(as endorsed by Casey and Hardie-Boys JJ):73 
 
“… in addition to any physical damage, intangible harm such as distress and injured 
feelings may be compensated for; the gravity of the breach and the need to 
emphasize the importance of the affirmed rights and to deter breaches are also 
proper considerations, but extravagant awards are to be avoided.  If damages are 
awarded on causes of action not based on the Bill of Rights, they must be allowed for 
in any award of compensation under the Bill of Rights so that there will be no double 
recovery.  A legitimate alternative approach, having the advantage of simplicity, 
would be to make a global award under the Bill of Rights and nominal or concurrent 
awards on any other successful causes of action.” 
 
This approach comprises the elements of compensation, vindication and deterrence, 
and would take account of any award under the private law.  Although the majority stressed 
that it would be inappropriate to refer to tort law in assessing public law damages, the 
above passage qualified the general statement and tortious award would still be relevant, at 
least regarding the element of compensation.  Thus, while the court started with a strong 
autonomous position, it ended up with an approach that bears close resemblance to the 
Canadian approach.  However, instead of distinguishing clearly vindication from 
compensation, Cooke P’s alternative solution was to make a global award without 
descending into details. The problem of a global award is that it tends to merge the award 
for compensatory and vindicatory purposes, which gives rise to a lot of confusion and 
ambiguities of the meaning of vindicatory damages in subsequent cases. 
 
Since then the Supreme Court has had a number of opportunities to reconsider the 
issue of damages.  The Baigent’s Case approach was never challenged.74  Instead, the focus 
was on the proper role of public law damages, its relationship with private law damages in 
tort, when public law damages would be available and how to assess the damages.75   
 
In Dunlea v Attorney General,76 another case of unreasonable body search of people 
mistakenly identified in an anti-terrorist operation, the question was whether damages for a 
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breach of the Bill of Rights should typically follow the tort assessment.   Without deciding 
the question, the majority opined in favour of a consistent approach.  Keith J, delivering the 
judgment of the majority, gave three reasons: (1) unlike Baigent’s Case where the tort claim 
failed, this was a case of a successful concurrent claim.  The rights in question have long 
been recognized by the common law tort where compensation had been provided.  These 
rights were affirmed by the Bill of Rights, and therefore the award should be comparable; 
(2) a comparable award was consistent with the approach adopted in overseas jurisdictions, 
notably the United States, Canada and Ireland; and (3) there was no aggravating factor to 
make a different award.77  
 
Thomas J, in partial dissent, found the overseas experience to be inconclusive.  He 
argued for a rights-centred approach as opposed to the private law “loss-centred” 
approach, and held that vindication of the intrinsic value of human rights was not the same 
as an award of exemplary damages.  It was the intrinsic value of the rights itself that 
deserved recognition.  Compensation for a breach of the Bill of Rights must therefore 
embrace the extra dimension of vindicating the claimant’s right, and therefore an amount 
over and above the damages which the common law torts have traditionally attracted.78 
While the amount may differ depending on the nature of the right that has been violated, 
the gravity of the breach, and such other matters as may be germane to the vindication of 
the right in the particular case, this award served to affirm the rights and not to punish the 
State.  He further rejected the Crown’s submission that an additional damage should only be 
available when there was no equivalent common law action or when existing remedy was 
inadequate.  Nor was he convinced that vindicatory damages would open the floodgates on 
the quantum of damages, as this could be judicially contained.  The learned judge again 
drew a distinction between vindicatory damages and compensatory damages:79 
 
“Not only must the plaintiffs be compensated for their loss, including the distress 
and humiliation which they suffered, but the plaintiffs’ rights must be vindicated by 
recognizing their worth to them.  To that end the compensation needs to be greater 
than that awarded by the trial judge and upheld in this court…. Unless awards are 
realistic, the value which the community has chosen to place on the observance of 
those rights must be depreciated.  What value is the right to be free of an 
unreasonable search or not to be unlawfully detained if the court’s remedies for 
breaches of those rights are seen to be miserly? Parliament’s will is not then 
implemented and the community’s expectations are not then met.” 
 
The Dunlea case has been considered as a marked departure of the autonomous 
approach to damages in a public law claim.80  This is probably an overstatement.  First, the 
majority expressly stated that this was not the occasion to consider the question whether 
the assessment of damages under the Bill of Rights should be different from that under tort 
arising from the same facts for essential the same wrong, for the simple reason that this 
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point was not argued or pursued in court.81  Secondly, their preference for a comparable 
award in tort was premised on the basis that this was a case of concurrent claim.  The 
majority was at pains to point out that this was not a case where a tort claim was 
unsuccessful or when the tort liability was exempted so that the only possible claim was one 
under the Bill of Rights.  It follows that had this not been a case of concurrent tort and 
public law claim, the same consideration might not be applicable.  Thirdly, the trial judge 
held that the two successful claimants who were mistakenly identified as terrorist suspects 
were entitled to an award respectively of $12,000 and $11,000 for a breach of their rights 
under the Bill of Rights and $6,000 and $5,000 as exemplary damages, with parallel awards 
for assault and false imprisonment.82  The majority of the Court of Appeal set aside the 
award for exemplary damages because the conduct of the officers were not “outrageous or 
high-handed”.  Having rejected the exemplary damages on the ground that they failed the 
common law test for the awards, the majority nonetheless upheld the overall awards in one 
lump sum for each of the two claimants in light of the nature and the wrong done to them.83  
It is unfortunate that the court did not provide any break down for the lump sum award.  
Yet if exemplary damages were considered to be inappropriate, what could have been the 
justification for upholding that same amount of awards apart from it constituting additional 
vindicatory damages under the Bill of Rights?   In this regard, the difference between the 
majority and the minority was just one of extent, with Thomas J being prepared to make a 
more generous award as vindicatory damages but unfortunately also without providing 
details of how he came to the amount.84   
 
The question of the relations between a public law action and a private law claim in 
tort was further addressed by the Supreme Court in two important subsequent cases. In 
Taunoa v Attorney General,85 a distinct public law approach to damages was again affirmed 
by the Supreme Court of New Zealand.  Unlike the Dunlea case, this was not a case of 
concurrent claims.  In Taunoa, the claimants were prisoners who were subject to inhuman 
and degrading treatment under an unlawfully strict regime. They brought an action under 
the Bill of Rights only.  The Supreme Court emphasized the public law nature of the remedy, 
and expressly endorsed the idea of vindicatory damages.   
 
The Court was unanimous in treating the public law claim separately from the 
private law claim as they served different purposes.  The purpose of public law was twofold: 
to prevent the recurrence of the wrongdoing by the State and to mark societal disapproval 
of the official conduct.  There were two victims in a Bill of Rights claim: the claimant as the 
immediate victim whose interests required the court to consider what, if any, compensation 
was due, and society as a whole as another victim. As the breach also tended to undermine 
the Rule of Law and societal norms, the court must also consider what was necessary by 
way of vindication in order to protect society’s interests in the observance of fundamental 
rights and freedoms.86  Accordingly, in assessing the Bill of Rights damages, the court should 
not attempt to match it with the quantum of awards in tort law.  Blanchard J pointed out 
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that there would be conceptual and practical difficulties in treating the Bill of Rights as a 
constitutional tort.  In developing constitutional damages, tort principles such as causation, 
remoteness and mitigation might not fit well with cases where fundamental rights have 
been violated.  Nor did the common law distinctions between compensatory, aggravated 
and exemplary damages apply.87   
 
The Supreme Court was unanimous that declaratory relief was not a sufficient 
remedy.88  However, at this point the Court began to use the terms “vindication” and 
“damages” in a rather confusing manner.  When a right has been infringed and a question of 
remedy arises, the general approach, as Blanchard J observed, was that the court “must 
begin by considering the non-monetary relief which should be given, and having done so it 
should ask whether that is enough to redress the breach and the consequent injury to the 
rights of the plaintiff in the particular circumstances.”  The primary task was to “find an 
overall remedy or set of remedies which was sufficient to deter any repetition by agents of 
the State and to vindicate the breach of the right in question”.89 The reference to an overall 
remedy for vindication appears to include compensation, vindication and deterrence.  
 
Elias CJ seems to adopt a more narrow meaning of vindication.  She emphasized that 
the damages are “to recognize the importance of the right and the gravity of the breach”.90 
They should try not only to compensate for the injury suffered through the denial of a right, 
which may include distress and injured feelings, as well as physical damages, but also to 
vindicate the importance of the rights.  In referring to an “additional” award to vindicate the 
importance of the right, 91 it is obvious that the Chief Justice did not intend to exclude 
compensatory award, for which assessment the tort principles would still be relevant.   
 
In contrast, Tippling J stated that the approach should involve considering how much 
was necessary to achieve respectively the vindicatory purpose and the compensatory 
purpose, and then awarding the higher of the two sums.  His reference to damages for 
vindicatory purpose seems to include both vindicatory damages, if any, and compensatory 
damages, as this seems implicit in the factors that he has identified as relevant in assessing 
damages, namely, (1) the nature of the right which has been violated; (2) the circumstances 
and the seriousness of the breach; (3) the seriousness of the consequences of the breach; 
(4) the response of the defendant to the breach, and (5) any relief awarded on a related 
cause of action.92  The last factor again pointed to the relevance of any tort award that has 
to be taken into consideration. Apart from damages, he also regarded the possibility of a 
more generous basis of awarding costs as part of the package of an effective remedy.93   
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Thus, notwithstanding the confusing use of the term “vindication”, it does not 
appear that the Court was to exclude the relevance of tort damages.  Meanwhile, the Court 
was unanimous in holding that exemplary damages were inappropriate in a public law claim.   
The objective of public law damages was not to punish the transgressor. Tippling J further 
noted that no serious weight should be placed on the deterrent element beyond what was 
inherent in the sum appropriate as vindication.94 He did not agree with the Supreme Court 
of Sri Lanka that deterrence was “hopelessly futile”, as there might be cases that deterrence 
might be relevant from the organization’s point of view to encourage better oversight and 
supervisory practices. Yet he did caution that deterrence should not be of major relevance 
given that punishment was hardly an appropriate consideration in public law and that 
damages were to be paid by the general taxpayers rather than the defendant as such.95 
 
The Court has not entered into any discussion of what damages would have been 
awarded under a tort claim, for the obvious reason that the claimants had not brought a 
tort claim.  Had this been done, the likely damages that might be recovered would be those 
for physical damages, and distress and injured feelings as compensatory damages and more 
likely, exemplary damages.  It appears that the Court has not excluded compensatory 
damages (save that they would be subsumed under the overall damages for vindication), 
and therefore the only significant difference between public law damages and tort damages 
would be exemplary damages.   It is likely that the Court had in mind the restrictive 
circumstances for making exemplary award for punishment and deterrence in the common 
law, and its remark of not attempting to seek equivalence with tort awards would have to 
be understood in this context.  Therefore, the amount of damages should not be 
extravagant.  The reference that the award had to be adequate to provide an incentive to 
the State not to repeat the infringing conduct and also not to give an impression of 
trivializing the violation reinforced the above reading that the Court had in mind the 
punitive function of damages.96  Such damages may be substantial if they are necessary in 
the particular circumstances.97 
 
By a majority, the Supreme Court lowered the damages awarded by the trial judge, 
but still awarded substantial damages to the three appellants respectively in the sum of 
$35,000, $20,000 and $4,000.  These sums were awarded to vindicate the right of personal 
liberty, taking into account the long period of detention, the degrading treatment meted 
out to them, and the attempt of the Government to stop the practice.  In making these 
awards, the Court was aware that there might well be another 200 prisoners who had been 
placed in a similar situation.  This factor prompted the remark of Blanchard J that the award 
of damages was “normally more to mark society’s disapproval of official conduct than it is to 
compensate for hurt to personal feelings.”98 
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In Liston-Lloyd v The Commissioner of Police, the claimant lodged a complaint against 
the police for unlawfully obtaining a buccal (oral) DNA sample pursuant to her conviction as 
the offence of which she was convicted was not a relevant offence for which such sample 
could be compelled.   She brought her claim under the Bill of Rights only.  Mallon J found 
that the sample was unlawfully obtained and hence there was a breach of her right under s 
21 of the Bill of Rights.  His Honour provided a succinct summary of the New Zealand 
position.99  He referred to the private and the public law components of vindication.  While 
it may be appropriate to have regard to common law damages, particularly where the focus 
of the award is on the compensation function, there is an “extra dimension” in a public law 
award of damages because of the constitutional dimension.  Hence, common law damages 
should “set the floor rather than the ceiling” for public law damages.100  His treatment of 
the functions of public law damages bears remarkable resemblance with the Canadian 
approach in Ward:101 
 
 “Vindication has both private and public law components.  This recognizes that 
 breaches of rights of this kind harm not only the particular victim of the breach but 
 the public generally (impairing public confidence in the efficacy of constitutional 
 protections).  The objective is to ‘affirm the right’ (that is to defend and uphold it) 
 and to deter further breaches.  An award of damages may serve these purposes by 
 compensating for the injury caused by the breach (compensation), marking the 
 wrong that has occurred (vindication) and deterring the breach (deterrence).  Thus, 
 NZBORA damages are concerned both with what a plaintiff should receive (the 
 compensation function) and what the defendant should pay (the vindication and 
 deterrence functions).  Any one of these purposes may support an award.  However, 
 damages are not ordinarily required for deterrence purposes because a declaration 
 ordinarily can be expected to encourage high standards of compliance.  Rather, they 
 are usually awarded to serve compensatory and/or vindicatory purposes.” (emphasis 
added) 
 
The court took into account that the breach involved highly personal information, 
but the distress involved was at the low end and there were proper precautions on the use 
that could be made of the information.  An award of $2,500 was made to compensate the 
claimant’s for the upset and distress suffered and to recognize her right to be secure from 
unreasonable search and seizure.  Mellon J expressly stated that if this were a common law 
tort action, an award of $1,500 would have been made.  He had adjusted the amount 
upward to mark the breach of an important right.102  
 
In Van Essen v Attorney General, the Court of Appeal carried out a survey of awards 
of public law damages, setting out the amounts awarded and the nature of the conduct that 
gave rise to the award.103  The Court concluded:  
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“First, in most cases in which damages are eventually awarded, the conduct 
concerned has involved physical restraint, direct infliction of physical harm, or a 
prolonged or significant deprivation of liberty.  These cases span in seriousness from 
physical detention, handcuffing, to inappropriate solitary confinement and physical 
violence in prison similar situations.  The seriousness of the circumstances is 
reflected in the quantum awarded to acknowledge the gravity of the breach in each 
case.  Conversely there are very few cases in which public law damages have been 
awarded where no physical damage or interference with liberty has occurred.  
Where damages have been awarded in such cases, this has typically been to reflect 
equivalence with tortious claims, or on the basis of clear pecuniary loss arising 
directly from the breach of the right itself.”104   
 
In that case, the Attorney General admitted liability for a wrongfully obtained search 
warrant under the Bill of Rights and accepted a declaration as an appropriate relief.  The 
common law claims for misfeasance in a public office and malicious procurement of the 
search warrants failed for want of evidence to substantiate the requisite intent. The tort 
claims for trespass to land and goods also failed because of statutory immunity.  The trial 
judge, applying Taunoa, made an award of $10,000 for damages under the Bill of Rights.105  
The issue before the Supreme Court was the appropriateness of the award of public law 
damages.  The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial judge on whether the facts disclosed 
any aggravating factor that would justify an award.  Accordingly, the public law damages 
were set aside, as a matter of a different assessment of facts rather than on any legal 
principle, and a declaration was held to constitute sufficient relief.  Interestingly, while the 
court found that this was not an appropriate case to grant public law damages, it was 
prepared to make a more generous award of indemnity costs to the claimants as part of the 
package of adequate relief.106 
 
Varuhas heavily criticized the decision in Taunoa.107  Amongst other things, it was 
argued that the public law paradigm in Taunoa would suppress the individual dimension in 
human rights claims.  Damages would be subject to an exceptionally broad, and 
impressionistic judicial discretion.  The assessment of damages was dominated by public 
interest concerns, which would not be the case in private law.   Individual interests in 
redress were not of subsidiary importance.  Rather than focusing on what was required to 
remedy a violation of the claimant’s interest, the focus was “nearly exclusively on whether 
the courts feel they are warranted in imposing liability on government.”108  While these 
arguments will be addressed later, two points could be made here.  First, it is important to 
note that in most of these cases, the only issue before the court was public law damages.  
The tort action either failed or was not pursued, and hence no damages could have been 
awarded under tort.  Thus, it is artificial to argue that the public law damages were lower 
than the tort damages.  Indeed, in most of these cases, the claimant was awarded more 
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than what he would have obtained under the common law.109  Secondly, while some of the 
judgments are not entirely clear, it appears that the focus of the court was not on 
compensatory damages.  Vindicatory damages are in addition to compensatory damages, so 
they do not and should not affect whatever compensatory damages that the claimant would 
be entitled to claim.  Therefore, it is incorrect to say that individual rights and interests were 
subsidiary.  Thirdly, compensatory damages aside, it has not been shown that a common 
law approach would have resulted in a higher amount.  In most of these cases, 
compensatory damages are simply not available. It is true that damages for vindication are 
available in those torts that are actionable per se, but it has not been shown that the court 
would have awarded a higher amount of damages for vindicatory purpose in similar 
circumstances.   
 
The court has also had an opportunity to consider the award of public law damages 
when the violation was partly attributable to the judiciary or the legislature.  In Currie v 
Clayton, the Court of Appeal noted that the Baigent’s case damages were an “exceptional 
remedy” that was only available in “egregious cases”.110 They were normally appropriate 
when the breach has resulted in some sort of irreparable harm.111 In this case, the claimants 
claimed for public law damages for breach of prosecutorial duty to disclose relevant 
materials on the credibility of a key witness in a criminal trial.  The court noted that a wide 
range of remedies such as exclusion of evidence, a stay of proceedings, quashing a decision 
made in breach of a guaranteed right, and a declaration of a NZBORA violation are available 
for a breach of the right to fair hearing. Hence, it would be rare for those who had been 
through the criminal process and had their NZBORA rights vindicated through such remedies 
to obtain a further remedy of compensation.112  In Attorney General v Chapman, the 
majority held that there was no claim for public law compensation for any alleged breaches 
by the judiciary of the right to fair trial on ground of judicial immunity and the public 
interest of maintaining judicial independence.113  Elias CJ gave a powerful dissent, noting 
that it would be difficult to separate judicial breaches of rights from breaches by other state 
actors, and such distinction would lead to arbitrary results and problematic questions of 
attribution or materiality.114 When fairness could still be achieved, a stay of proceeding was 
inappropriate, and damages may be an appropriate remedy for undue delay.  There was no 
reason why damages should not be available if the delay was partly attributable to the 
judiciary, or when an unreasonable search was a result of a mistake in granting a warrant.115 
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 In Taylor v Attorney General, the court held that it had jurisdiction to make a 
declaration of inconsistency of the statutory restriction of the rights of prisoners to vote 
with the Bill of Rights.116  Although this is not a case on damages, the court noted that 
where there has been a breach of the Bill of Rights, there is a need for the court to fashion 
public law remedies to respond to the wrong inherent in any breach of a fundamental right, 
nor should the legislative branch of Government be in any different position.  For parity, it is 
arguable that if one of the purposes of awarding damages is vindication, there seems to be 
no good reason to exempt the legislative branch if the violation is caused by fragmented 
encroachment by statute, albeit that damages are only awarded on rare occasions in the 
case of statutory encroachment so as not to deter public officers from carrying out statutory 
duties. 
 
In summary, a body of precedent in public law damages has gradually emerged.  The 
New Zealand courts have clearly opted for an independent approach for public law damages 
that is distinct from tort law.  They serve different purposes and are best kept separated.  
The Bill of Rights has created new remedy, and the question is no longer whether a remedy 
is available for the violation of a constitutional right, but whether existing remedies are 
adequate to provide an effective remedy for that violation.117 The primary duty of the court 
is to fashion such a remedy.  Public law damages are among the remedies available; they are 
direct and not vicarious claims against the State. Damages are discretionary and may not be 
necessary, but if they are considered necessary, the court should approach the assessment 
independently with a view to achieving compensation to the claimant, vindication of the 
constitutional rights and deterrence.  It is unfortunate that these separate functions are not 
spelt out clearly, resulting in confusing use of the term “vindication”.  However, stripped of 
the semantic problems, it appears that ordinary tort law principles are still relevant to 
inform the assessment of damages in a public law claim, particularly in the situation of 
concurrent claims with private law. But even in such cases, the court is not required to seek 
equivalence in tort law.  While there should not be double recovery, vindication may require 
an extra amount than that available under tort law.   The amount of vindicatory damages 
should neither be derisory or excessive; they should adequately reflect the importance of 
the constitutional rights in the particular society, along with the seriousness and 
consequences of the breach.  Damages are mostly available or required when there was 
physical violation to the liberty or integrity of the person, or when the violation has resulted 
in irreparable harm, and would be available only when the breach reached a certain degree 
of gravity.  Thus, while New Zealand has started with a strong autonomous approach to 
public law damages, there is now considerable convergence in its approach with that of 
Canada.   Damages may also be available for violation of the rights to fair hearing if other 
remedies are not effective or adequate.  It is still an open question whether damages would 
be available for violation caused by the judiciary or by statutory encroachment.   
 
 
2.5 United Kingdom 
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In the United Kingdom, the discussion on public law damages is largely shaped by the 
judgment of the House of Lords in R (Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department on the relationship between the Human Rights Act (“HRA”) and the European 
Convention of Human Rights.118  Section 8(3) of the HRA provides that no award of damages 
is to be made unless, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, the court is 
satisfied that the award is necessary to afford “just satisfaction” to the claimant.  Section 
8(4) then provides that in deciding whether to award damages and the consequent 
quantum of damages, the courts must “take into account the principles applied by the 
European Court of Human Rights in relation to the award of compensation under Article 41 
of the Convention.”   In this case, the House of Lords held that (1) the award of damages 
under the HRA was to be closely modeled on awards made by the European Court of Human 
Rights, and not on damages awarded under domestic law of tort.  It was Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and not domestic precedents that should guide the courts in the award of 
human rights damages, and (2) the aim of the HRA “was not to give victims better remedies 
at home than they could recover in Strasbourg but to give them the same remedies without 
the delay and expense of resort to Strasbourg.”119  Lord Bingham gave two reasons for this 
decision.  Firstly, as a matter of Parliamentary intention, the purpose of the HRA, as 
revealed in the White Paper, was to enable claimants “to receive compensation from a 
domestic court equivalent to what they would have received in Strasbourg.”120  Secondly, as 
a matter of statutory interpretation, section 8(4) requires the court to take into account the 
principles applied by the European Court of Human Rights, not only when an award would 
be made but also what the quantum of an award should be. This so-called “mirror 
approach” has been universally criticized.121 
 
The Greenfield decision of the House of Lords contravenes two major principles in 
human rights law.  Firstly, as a regional treaty, the European Convention is intended to set 
the minimum standards.122  The “mirror approach”, which requires English courts to achieve 
similar awards as the Strasbourg court might be expected to do,123 has effectively turned 
the standards under the European Convention into the maximum standards.   Section 8(4) 
requires the court only to take into account “the principles” applied by the Strasbourg 
Court. A distinction could be drawn between “principles” and “remedies”.  As the Law 
Commissions of England and Wales and of Scotland observed in their joint report, the 
English courts are only required to take “the principles” into account, leaving it free for the 
domestic courts to develop the quantum of damages to be awarded.124 The “mirror 
approach” may arguably be justified regarding the development of uniform principles 
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governing rights and liabilities, but it does not follow that the same analysis should be 
applied to remedies.  It is contrary to the general spirit of the Convention to provide a 
minimum standard of protection when Strasbourg decisions on the quantum of award are 
taken as the ceiling rather than the base of the award.   
    
Secondly, by adhering to the damages awarded by the Strasbourg Court, the State 
arguably fails to discharge its treaty obligation to provide effective remedies under Art 13 of 
the European Convention, which obligation falls primarily on the domestic courts.  It is true 
that the HRA has not incorporated Art 13, but the reason was to afford greater latitude for 
the British courts to fashion appropriate remedies, rather than to let the Strasbourg court to 
lead in this area.125 As Varuhas observed, it was precisely because English courts were “rich 
in remedies” that the Government considered it unnecessary to incorporate Art 13, so that 
at least in the area of remedies, the power would be given back to British courts.126 Indeed, 
the primary duty is set out in section 8(1), that is, the courts should grant such relief or 
remedy as it considers just and appropriate.  This broad discretion is limited by section 8(3) 
so that damages could only be awarded to afford “just satisfaction”.  While this term is 
borrowed from Article 41, this article is an enabling provision to confer jurisdiction on the 
European Court to award remedies.  It is not a provision to impose obligations on domestic 
courts to adhere to the remedies granted by the Strasbourg Court.  Thus, section 8(3) should 
be interpreted in light of section 8(1) and Article 13 of the Convention.  The phrase “just 
satisfaction” should then be construed as nothing more than the familiar duty to grant “just 
and effective remedies”.127 This is buttressed by the fact that no remedy would be just and 
appropriate if it fails to take into account the domestic situation and the special 
circumstances of the case, neither of which are matters that an international court is 
suitably placed or equipped to make an assessment on. 128 It could not have been the 
intention of the Legislature to restrict the discretion of the court to afford just and effective 
remedies.  Nor does the reference in section 8(4) to Article 41 absolve the State from its 
treaty obligation to afford and develop effective remedies.  The purpose of section 8(4) is to 
ensure that the domestic awards should not fall below that made by the international court, 
whose awards should provide the base and not the ceiling of remedies.129 
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Indeed, Lord Carnwath reinforced the point in an extra-judicial context.130 Insofar as 
pecuniary damages are concerned, it is largely about an assessment of evidence, and the 
European Court is not in the same position as a domestic court to evaluate evidence.  
Moreover, the economic situation of different jurisdictions makes it difficult to make any 
meaningful comparison.  Given that the European Court is a highly diverse court with 
members coming from a variety of background and experience, it is better for English courts 
to develop their own jurisprudence.  There is no reason to suppose that domestic 
assessment of non-pecuniary damages would not satisfy the requirement of “just 
satisfaction” under the Convention.  Remarkably, for someone who has participated in the 
European Court, Lord Carnwath pointed out that the European Court would indeed be 
informed by the jurisprudence of domestic courts on damages!131 The House of Lords’ 
decision in Greenfield will result in circular reasoning.132 
 
Lord Bingham held that the HRA was not a statutory tort, as its objects were 
different and broader.  This is in line with the approach of other jurisdictions.  The rights are 
public law, not private law rights.  The object of the HRA is to protect these rights against 
the State.133 The primary function of tort remedies is to provide compensation for the 
wrongdoing, whereas the primary function of a HRA action is the vindication of rights. Yet it 
does not follow that the court should then ignore altogether the well-established principles 
of award of damages in domestic law.  Nor does it follow that the court would then have to 
follow slavishly the decisions of a foreign court, with its different composition and domestic 
situation.  Andrew Burrows argued that the mere fact that a violation of HRA is a non-
tortious wrong does not mean that the scale of quantum of damages for compensation for 
non-pecuniary loss in tort law should be rejected.  He criticized that the approach in 
Greenfield could not be supported in principle or in practice.134  Reference to Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is not practical, as there is an absence of any clear principles on damages. The 
difficulty is further compounded by the loose adherence to precedents from Strasbourg and 
different equivalence of monetary value among member States to the Convention.  A 
caution to be made is that the distinction between pecuniary loss and non-pecuniary loss at 
the Strasbourg courts are not the same as compensatory damages and vindicatory damages 
in this context, and any comparison of the size of award may have to be treated with 
caution.  Further, the approach of the House of Lords is also in marked contrast to that 
adopted by the Privy Council in Ramanoop, the judgment of which was delivered within a 
month after Greenfield.  If the House of Lords had not decided to tie English law with 
Strasbourg jurisprudence in terms of damages, the English courts would have been able to 
develop distinct public law remedies as in Canada or New Zealand.   
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A consequence of Greenfield is that damages under the HRA, if ever awarded, would 
typically be lower than that in tort law for the same loss or violations. Indeed, if the remedy 
for interference with Convention rights is consistently less generous than the domestic 
remedy in tort, this may itself raise a question of compliance with the European 
Convention.135  As Andrew Burrows powerfully stated: 
 
“the rights protected by the HRA 1998 cause of action are fundamental rights.  They 
are at least as important as the rights protected by the law of tort.  If a victim suffers, 
and is being compensated for, a loss as a result of a breach by a public authority of 
his or her Convention rights, he or she should receive at least the same 
compensation as he or she would be entitled to in tort for suffering the same loss.  
One is otherwise treating a breach of a Convention right less seriously than the 
breach of a right protected in tort.”136 
 
Given the House of Lords’ decision in Greenfield, which frustrated general 
expectations of developing a close relationship between tort and the HRA, it is not 
surprising that many commentators turn to tort law as an alternative. The pendulum has 
swung from total exclusion of tort principles to complete assimilation of tort principles.  It 
was argued that either tort law, the development of which would be free from the 
constraints of the HRA, may provide the appropriate remedies, or that the court should 
abandon the “mirror approach” and seek assistance from tort principles in domestic law in 
assessing damages.137   
 
Despite the emergence of varying degrees of acceptance of vindicatory damages in 
various jurisdictions, vindicatory damages were doubted if not rejected by the majority of 
the House of Lords in Lumba (Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.138  In 
that case, the claimants were detained pending deportation pursuant to an unpublished 
policy.  It was found that they would inevitably have been detained if the Secretary of State 
had applied the published policy.  Hence, the issue was (1) whether the detention was 
unlawful; and (2) if so, whether they would be entitled to damages for their false 
imprisonment.  The court split on both questions of liability and quantum.  For the majority 
of six judges who held that the State was liable, three of them (Lord Collins, Lord Dyson and 
Lord Brown) held that the claimants were entitled to no more than nominal damages, and 
the other three judges (Lord Hope, Lady Hale and Lord Walker) held that they were entitled 
to either exemplary damages or vindicatory damages, but they also split among themselves 
on quantum.  
 
Lord Dyson drew a distinction between a vindicatory purpose and vindicatory 
damages.  It was one thing to say that an award of compensatory damages was to serve a 
vindicatory purpose; it was quite another thing to make an additional award simply to 
                                                     
135
 See Steele, n 26 above, at 606; Burrows, n 20 above, at 298.  
136
 Burrows, n 20 above, at 298. 
137
 See, for example, Burrows, ibid. 
138
 [2011] 2 WLR 671.  For an analysis of this case, see Chuks Okpaluba, “Vindicatory approach to the award of 
constitutional and public law damages: contemporary Commonwealth developments” (2012) 45(2) The 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 127, at 149-157.  See also McBride and Bagshaw, 
Tort Law (Pearson Education, 2015), at 846-848 
 31 
reflect the nature of the wrong.  As the claimants had suffered no loss or damage as a result 
of the unlawful exercise of the power to detain, they should receive no more than nominal 
damages.  His Lordships criticized vindicatory damages as arbitrary and unprincipled, serving 
no useful purpose, and as an “unruly horse”, they should be discarded.139 Besides, if they 
were available for false imprisonment, there was no reason why they should not be 
extended to other torts.  Lord Collins held that all damages, be it compensatory or 
vindicatory, served the incidental purpose of vindicating a right; therefore there was no 
purpose to make a separate award for vindicatory damages.140  His Lordship refused to 
follow Ward and Taunoa, and noted that exemplary damages under the common law would 
be adequate to serve the vindicatory purpose where the executive has acted in an 
oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional manner. 141 
 
To the extent that vindicatory damages should not be awarded if conventional 
remedies, including declaratory relief and exemplary damages, provide sufficient relief, the 
decision of the majority of the House of Lords is impeccable.  However, this does not 
address the question of whether vindicatory damages should be available if other remedies 
are inadequate to reflect the gravity of the wrong done.  It would require a momentous leap 
in reasoning to infer from the fact that conventional damages provide adequate relief in a 
particular case to a general conclusion that vindicatory damages should never be recognized 
in any case.  
 
In contrast, Lady Hale, supported by Lord Hope and Lord Walker in the minority, 
preferred to rest her decision on the centrality of constitutional rights: these rights are so 
important that the law should be able to vindicate in some way, irrespective of whether 
compensatable harm has been suffered or whether the conduct of the authorities has been 
so egregious as to merit exemplary damages.142  Here, the conduct of the official was so 
deplorable that she was prepared to award a modest sum of £500 to recognize the 
claimant’s fundamental right whereas Lord Walker and Lord Hope were prepared to be 
more generous to award a sum of £1,000.  An underlying point of contention between the 
two groups of judges is the fundamental question of whether the law should provide 
damages only for consequences of a violation of a constitutional right, in the absence of 
which only nominal damages should be awarded, or whether the law should provide 
damages for the very act of violation itself, thereby acknowledging that the constitutional 
right itself has an intrinsic value that deserves protection. 
 
 
2.6 South Africa 
 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa is prepared to fashion a new remedy, if necessary, 
to protect and enforce constitutional rights, and emphasised that an appropriate relief has 
to be an effective remedy to vindicate the entrenched rights.  The approach to 
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constitutional damages is, however, unsettled.  In Hoffmann v South African Airways, the 
Constitutional Court held that a determination of appropriate relief should balance various 
objectives, including (1) to address the wrong; (2) to deter future violations; (3) to make an 
order that can be complied with; and (4) to be fair to all those who might be affected by the 
infringement.143  In the leading case of Fose v Minister of Safety and Security,144 the 
Constitutional Court held that appropriate relief might include an award for damages where 
such an award may be necessary to enforce constitutional rights.  Didcott J highlighted that 
society has an interest in the defence against encroachment of constitutional rights, as their 
encroachment will, unless adequately remedied, impair public confidence and diminish 
public faith in the efficacy of the protection and encourage further violations.  Ackermann J, 
in an oft-cited passage, held:145 
 
 “It seems to me that there is no reason in principle why appropriate relief should not 
include an award of damages, where such an award is necessary to protect and 
enforce chap 3 rights.  Such awards are made to compensate persons who have 
suffered loss as a result of the breach of a statutory right if, on a proper construction 
of the statute in question, it was the Legislature’s intention that such damages 
should be payable, and it would be strange if damages could not be claimed for, at 
least, loss occasioned by the breach of a right vested in the claimant by the supreme 
law.  When it would be appropriate to do so, and what the measure of damages 
should be will depend on the circumstances of each case and the particular right 
which has been infringed.” 
 
While Ackermann J agreed that vindication is the primary object of a constitutional 
remedy, he is skeptical of separating constitutional damages from delictual damages.  He 
rejected the relevance of nominal damages, which were hardly “effective or appropriate” as 
they were not compensatory in outlook, purport and effect.  They would serve no deterrent 
or preventive effect, and a nominal punitive award would only serve to trivialize the rights 
violated.146   He further rejected the relevance of exemplary damages, as there should be no 
place for punitive damages in constitutional law.  Such damages were not “justifiable in a 
modern system of law”.147 The Court was content to hold that delictual damages under 
common law would be sufficient to redress breaches of fundamental rights in light of the 
facts of that case, and left open the issue whether an action for damages in the nature of 
constitutional damages existed in law and, if so, whether constitutional damages could be 
awarded in addition to delictual damages.148  Likewise, in Law Society of South Africa v 
Minister of Transport, Moseneke DCJ expressed a preference for developing common law 
remedies to vindicate constitutionally entrenched rights.149 
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The point was taken up in Member of the Executive Council: Welfare v Kate, a case 
concerning a claim for constitutional damages for undue delay in approving applications for 
social welfare.150 The Supreme Court of Appeal held that whether monetary damages were 
appropriate in a particular case must necessarily be determined casuistically with due 
regard to, amongst other things, the nature and relative importance of the rights that were 
in issue, the alternative remedies that might be available to assert and vindicate them, and 
the consequences of the breach for the claimant concerned.  The court found that the delay 
was endemic in nature and the problem had been in existence for years; thus, a declaration 
would not serve any useful purpose.151  It also rejected mandamus as an effective remedy as 
it would only encourage more litigation without addressing the systemic issues.   Having 
decided that Fose posed no obstacle to an award of constitutional damages, the Court of 
Appeal held that the violation should be remedied directly by constitutional remedy and not 
indirectly by delictual damages. Furthermore, the endemic breach called for a clear 
recognition of the constitutional right.  On the relationship between delictual and 
constitutional damages, Nugent JA held:152 
 
“No doubt the infusion of constitutional normative values into delictual principles 
itself plays a role in protecting constitutional rights, albeit indirectly.  And no doubt 
delictual principles are capable of being extended to encompass state liability for the 
breach of constitutional obligations.  But the relief that is permitted by s 38 of the 
Constitution is not a remedy of last resort, to be looked to only when there is no 
alternative – and indirect – means of asserting and vindicating constitutional rights.  
While that possibility is a consideration to be borne in mind in determining whether 
to grant or to withhold a direct s 38 remedy it is by no means decisive, for there will 
be cases in which the direct assertion and vindication of constitutional rights is 
required.  Where that is so the further question is what form of remedy would be 
appropriate to remedy the breach.  In my view the breach in the present case 
warrants being vindicated directly for two reasons in particular.  First, I see no 
reason why a direct breach of a substantive constitutional right (as opposed to 
merely a deviation from a constitutionally normative standard) should be remedied 
indirectly.  Secondly, the endemic breach of the rights that are now in issue justifies 
– indeed, it calls out for – the clear assertion of their independent existence.” 
 
Constitutional damages were also affirmed and awarded in Modderfontein Squatters 
v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, a case concerning the failure of the State to protect the 
property right of the claimant against trespassers, resulting in the land being occupied by 
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approximately 40,000 persons.153  The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the return of 
land was not feasible.  Damages were the only realistic remedy so that the property owner 
would be compensated, the occupiers could remain where they were, and the State was 
relieved from the burden of providing alternative land for a huge number of people.  The 
damages, which were to be assessed, appeared to be compensatory rather than vindicatory 
in nature.154   
 
Conversely, in The Minister of Police v Mboweni, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
distinguished both Kate and Modderklip, describing them as the only two cases where 
constitutional damages were awarded.155 Mboweni involved a claim by the daughters for 
deprivation of their constitutional right to parental care, as a result of the death of their 
father in police custody caused by wrongful police conduct.  The Court of Appeal was 
troubled by the lack of evidence on liability, and rejected the approach of the court below to 
start an inquiry with the appropriateness of remedy as being incorrect and premature.  Even 
if liability could have been established, which the Court of Appeal was doubtful, the proper 
approach was to first consider the adequacy of the existing remedy under the common law.  
If it was inadequate, the court should consider whether the deficiency could be remedied by 
a development of the common law.  It doubted if constitutional damages would encompass 
a solatium or general damages.156   
 
The comments of the Supreme Court of Appeal on constitutional damages in 
Mboweni may be obiter, as the primary decision was that the claim for a loss of 
constitutional right to parental care has not been established.  Nonetheless, it is illustrative 
of the general position in South Africa.  While the right to constitutional damages as an 
appropriate relief has been acknowledged, an award for constitutional damages is regarded 
as exceptional and secondary, only when the common law remedies have been exhausted 
and found to be inadequate.  The courts clearly prefer to develop the common law 
remedies, if necessary to expand the common law delictual principles in light of the 
constitutional imperatives, then to engage in an award for constitutional damages.  
However, as noted by Currie and De Waal, there are at least two reasons why development 
of constitutional damages is necessary.  Firstly, there are circumstances that a declaratory 
relief or other remedies would make no sense and damages may be the only appropriate 
remedy to vindicate the rights.  Secondly, the possibility of a substantial award may 
encourage victims to litigate, hence deterring further infringements.157   
 
 
2.7 Hong Kong 
 
In Hong Kong, the issue of constitutional damages has arisen only recently and is still largely 
an open question.  In Ghulam Rbani v Secretary for Justice, the applicant was wrongfully 
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detained and claimed damages under tort principles and the Bill of Rights.158  The court 
awarded damages in the sum of HK$30,000 for false imprisonment.  The Bill of Rights claim 
failed because of a reservation in the Bill of Rights Ordinance regarding immigration 
decisions.  The court, however, proceeded to discuss the claim for constitutional damages if 
the Bill of Rights claim were successful.  The court referred to Ward in Canada and Baigent’s 
case in New Zealand, and noted that they were not followed by the House of Lords in Lumba 
(Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department. 159   Without deciding if there was a 
right to constitutional damages, the court held that the claim for constitutional damages did 
not add anything to the claim for damages for false imprisonment, and even if constitutional 
damages were available, no award should be made to avoid double recovery. 
 
In Ho Chee Shing James v Secretary for Justice,160 the applicant, a civil servant who 
was denied a fair hearing at a disciplinary proceeding, filed a tort claim for breach of the Bill 
of Rights, partly because he was time-barred to take out judicial review proceeding, and 
partly because there were serious disputes of fact which could only be resolved by discovery 
and made the case inappropriate for judicial review.  Relying on the drafting history of the 
Bill of Rights, the Court held that it was not the intention of the legislature to create a 
statutory tort for a violation of the Bill of Rights.161  Any action under the Bill of Rights would 
only be a public law claim.   The court added, in passing, that the constitutional claim would 
add nothing to a tort or a breach of contract claim.   More recently, in Saeed v Secretary for 
Justice, a case concerning arbitrary body search, Judge Li distinguished Ward and Baigent’s 
case partly because of their rejection in the United Kingdom, yet also on the basis of 
dissimilar social and economic background in Canada and a more liberal approach to civil 
liberty and constitutional matters in New Zealand. He remarked that the law in Hong Kong 
has not developed to a stage where vindicatory damages were recognized for breach of 
constitutional rights, in addition to the conventional damages awards.162 
 
In all these cases, the courts were heavily influenced by the House of Lords’ decision 
in Lumba, and have not conducted a thorough examination of the issues.  Nor has the 
higher court had an opportunity to consider these issues. 
 
 
2.8 Other Jurisdictions163 
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Reference has already been made to Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Ramanoop, 
where Sharma CJ first coined the term “vindicatory damages”.164 The Chief Justice had held 
in an earlier case that the courts would be guilty of the most serious betrayal if they failed to 
secure and vindicate constitutional rights that were violated.165  In the words of the 
President of the Caribbean Court of Justice, “every time a constitutionally protected right or 
freedom is contravened without an effective response from the courts, the right or freedom 
breached suffers diminishment.  For the court’s response to be effective, it must serve to 
vindicate the right or freedom infringed by countering the negative effect of its breach.”166 
Since the principal judgment of the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago 
v Ramanoop,167 vindicatory damages have been consistently awarded by the Privy 
Council,168 an approach that stands in sharp contrast to the United Kingdom.  
 
India has held that the Constitution provided a separate cause of action that is 
independent of a tort action.  Damages have been awarded as an additional remedy in a 
public law action for breach of a constitutional right.169  In Ireland, the Court took the view 
that common law torts are in general sufficient to vindicate constitutional wrongs.  It was 
thus prepared to eschew the distinction between different forms of damages and was 
prepared to award substantial damages for a breach of constitutional rights.  In Kennedy v 
Ireland, Hamilton P set out the approach of the court:170 
 
“… the injury done to the plaintiffs has been aggravated by the fact that it has been 
done by an organ of the state which is under a constitutional obligation to respect, 
vindicate and defend their rights.  The plaintiffs are in my opinion entitled to 
substantial damages and it is, in the circumstances of the case, irrelevant whether 
they be described as ‘aggravated’ or ‘exemplary’ damages.” 
 
In the United States, constitutional rights could be enforced by an action under s 
1983 of the USC, which created a constitutional tort against the individual perpetrators 
acting on behalf of the federal government or state law but not local government.   
Alternatively, a civil action against state or federal officials is possible under the so-called 
Biven’s action, 171 but this is rarely available and not constitutionally significant.172 Punitive 
damages are available under both actions, and a substantial amount of punitive damages 
are frequently awarded.  This has been explained on two alternative grounds.173  First, there 
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is a deeply-seated distrust against the Government and a strong belief in individual rights in 
the American tradition.  Hence, punitive damages are more readily awarded for any 
violation of constitutional rights. Secondly, American juries tend to award a huge sum of 
damages, compensatory or otherwise, and the repeated awards of breath-taking amounts 
of punitive damages have desensitized American society to such awards. This unique social 
and cultural background and legal tradition in the United States make it difficult to do any 
meaningful comparison with other systems.   
 
 
2.9 A Summary 
 
A few observations can be drawn from the above comparative survey.  Firstly, virtually all 
jurisdictions agree that a breach of constitutional rights is a public law action.  Although 
Professor Forsyth has argued that a breach of the Human Rights Act could be perceived as a 
species of breach of statutory duty,174 no jurisdiction has so far gone down this path and the 
argument has indeed been rejected in all major common law jurisdictions. 
 
Secondly, the court has a duty to provide effective remedy for a violation of 
constitutional rights.  This duty may arise as a result of international treaty obligations, 
constitutional obligations or common law (or a combination of all or some of them).  To be 
effective, the remedy has to be just and appropriate.  What constitutes “just and 
appropriate” remedy would depend on the circumstances of each case. 
 
Thirdly, the court has a discretion to consider what remedy is just and appropriate in 
each case.  A just and appropriate remedy may include damages, but they are not necessary 
in all cases.   
 
Fourthly, a claimant is entitled to be compensated for the loss that he has suffered 
as a result of the constitutional wrong.  This is the same whether the damages are known as 
common law damages or constitutional damages.  Compensation may cover both tangible 
(physical, psychological) and intangible loss (distress, humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety, 
and so on).  The claimant must show that the loss was caused by the breach, and to 
substantiate the claim for the loss. 
 
Fifthly, non-pecuniary damages, including exemplary or aggravated damages, are 
available under the common law. 
 
Sixthly, as a matter of general principle, a claimant is not entitled to double recovery. 
 
Beyond this common foundation, there are divergent approaches to the award and 
assessment of constitutional damages.  In Canada and New Zealand, the assessment of 
constitutional damages is an independent exercise that is separated from the common law 
claim.  Constitutional damages serve the purpose of compensation, vindication and 
deterrence.  If the constitutional wrong also constitutes an actionable tort, damages 
                                                                                                                                                                     
awarded at trial or affirmed on appeal, and in two cases, over $3 biliion in punitive damages were awarded (in 
one of them the punitive damages were indeed reduced from an initial award of $11.9 billion!) 
174
 HWR Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 11
th
 ed, 2014), 637.   
 38 
awarded under tort law should be adopted as a guide, but nothing more than guidance, in 
assessing constitutional damages.  Compensatory damages are largely modeled on tort law, 
though the court insisted that they are not the same. Vindicatory damages should be 
awarded only when other remedies are inadequate. The amount of vindicatory damages 
should be moderate, but not derisory, and it should be adequate to reflect the importance 
of the constitutional rights that were being violated. In both jurisdictions, a body of 
precedent on constitutional damages has gradually emerged.  In India and Ireland, the 
courts are prepared to award damages in addition to that awarded under tort principles.  
While South Africa is prepared to accept vindicatory damages, they would be awarded only 
in exceptional circumstances. The courts prefer to develop common law principles and have 
more or less confined public law damages to those that are recoverable under common law 
principles.  The position in the United Kingdom is awkward.  On the one hand, the English 
courts rejected the relevance of tort damages, and were prepared to adhere to Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, which was a widely criticized position.  On the other hand, they also rejected 
vindicatory damages, as such damages do not add anything to common law damages and 
their recognition would serve no useful purpose.  Most commentators advocated for the 
adoption of tort principles to make awards of damages under the HRA.  In Hong Kong, a 
similarly skeptical attitude was adopted regarding vindicatory damages. 
 
 
3. Objections to Vindicatory Damages 
 
3.1 Purposes of Vindicatory Damages 
 
3.1.1 The Objections 
 
A principal objection to vindicatory damages goes to the purposes served by vindicatory 
damages.  In Lumba (Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,175 Lord Collins 
remarked that whatever their purposes, they were adequately served by existing remedies. 
His Lordship stated emphatically:176 
 
“In my view, the purpose of vindicating a claimant’s common law rights is sufficiently 
met by (i) an award of compensatory damages, including (in the case of strict liability 
torts) nominal damages where no substantial loss is proved; (ii) where appropriate, a 
declaration in suitable terms; and (iii) again, where appropriate, an award of 
exemplary damages.  There is no justification for awarding vindicatory damages for 
false imprisonment to any of the FNPs.” 
 
Likewise, Andrew Burrows rejected vindicatory damages as “entirely arbitrary” and 
serving no valid or useful purpose.177 Given the existence of exemplary or punitive damages, 
it was argued that nothing useful would be gained by introducing vindicatory damages into 
English tort law.   
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Jenny Steele is more cautious.178  She argued that the skepticism of the role of tort in 
human rights claim is an overreaction.  The two causes of action serve some overlapping 
and some distinct objectives. While the two causes of action are not coterminous, at least in 
those areas where they overlap, the quantum of damages in tort law should provide prima 
facie measures for assessment of damages for a violation of HRA.   Indeed, some areas such 
as deprivation of personal liberty, tort law may have more to offer as it tends to be more 
generous.  Tort law may also be benefited by parallel developments under the HRA.  Like 
Burrows, she was skeptical of the utility of vindicatory damages, as tort law, when properly 
understood, would also be able to serve the same vindicatory purposes in public law and 
there is no need to resort to the unorthodox notion of vindicatory damages.  
 
Robert Stevens took the case even further.  He took on the House of Lords by 
arguing that the HRA was indeed possibly the most important tort statute ever enacted.  He 
argued that the award of damages in all cases of tort and breach of contract is non-
compensatory; instead, they are to provide a substitute for, and hence to vindicate, the 
right that has been infringed.179  Substitute damages are assessed by valuing the right 
infringed.  It is irrelevant whether a claimant has suffered any loss or made any gain, 
although such loss could be added as consequential damages.  It is unnecessary for this 
article to devolve into this conceptual argument.  A major problem of Stevens’ thesis is that 
it is over-inclusive, as Burrows has convincingly demonstrated.180 
 
3.1.2 Vindication in Public Law 
 
These objections raise the question of in what ways vindication in public law is 
different from vindication in private law, if this is one of the functions of private law.  Again 
it should be emphasized that vindication (and for this purpose vindicatory damages) in 
public law bears a narrow specific meaning of vindicating the intrinsic worth of 
constitutional rights.  In general, tort remedies are compensatory and bipolar in nature, 
seeking to redress the consequences of a breach of duty owed to the plaintiffs.  The 
traditional purposes of damages in private law are to compensate the plaintiff, punish the 
defendant or achieve restitution, with vindication at best assuming a secondary purpose, 
save in those torts that protect against interference with a personal right.181 The emphasis is 
on what the plaintiff is entitled to receive. Public law remedies seek an additional purpose 
of vindicating a public right that the state has solemnly affirmed to respect and to protect.   
The violation is a breach by the State of an obligation that is owed to the public, the plaintiff 
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being one of the subjects.  Thus, in addition to considering what the plaintiff is entitled to 
receive, the court has to consider also what the defendant must pay for what, if any, is 
necessary to vindicate the breach or denounce the conduct concerned or deter future 
breaches.   
 
Unlike private law under which the court, in awarding damages, typically looks back 
to events that have already taken place in order to determine how to compensate the 
victim or punish the transgressor, public law damage is concerned not just with the past, but 
also with the future.  As Robinson and Prinsloo pointed out, public law damages should be 
forward-looking, community oriented and structural,182 as they have routinely had an 
impact on governance and public administration that goes far beyond the immediate case 
before the court and may affect even third parties. As Hammond J observed:183 
 
“Cases based upon violations of the Bill of Rights are about the vindication of 
statutory policies which are not ‘just’ private: they have overarching, public 
dimensions.  The context of such a proceeding necessarily changes, in at least three 
ways.  First, the case is not a winner-takes-all kind of case.  Damages are an 
economic concept.  Bill of Rights cases routinely involve a rearrangement of the 
social relations between the parties, and sometimes with third parties.  The object is 
to promote mutual justice, and to protect the weak from the strong.  Secondly, the 
future consequences of such a case are every bit as important as the past, and the 
particular transgression.  Thirdly, there is a distinct interface with public 
administration, and indeed, the governance of a given jurisdiction.” 
 
Likewise, Amos argued against the adoption of the tort model, as tort law was not 
designed to resolve claims for damages involving breaches of human rights, nor was it clear 
if tort would result in a higher level of damages.184  Du Bois argued that it is better to 
develop constitutional damages independently of the common law.  Tort law is about 
corrective justice between two parties, with each having corresponding rights and 
obligations, whereas constitutional damages are about distributive justice between two 
unequal parties, one having more power over the other.  Tort remedies aim to restore the 
parties to the original position as if no tort has been committed, whilst constitutional 
remedies aim at ensuring the proper exercise of public powers and limiting the impact or 
the consequences of the act of the public authorities over the subject.  The object of public 
law remedies is to achieve restorative justice as well as distributive justice, under which the 
primary consideration would be proportionality and rationality in order to produce a socially 
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just result. Thus, the framework for tort damages is ill-suited to providing remedies in 
respect of breaches by the State of its duties under public law. 185 
 
3.1.3 Vindication in Private Law 
 
Jason Varuhas challenges those in support of vindicatory damages for taking too 
narrow a view of vindication in private law.  He argues that different torts serve different 
functions, and that vindication is nothing new and has always long been the primary 
function in some torts, such as those torts that are actionable per se or defamation (which 
he called “vindicatory torts”), and that damages have been awarded in order to reinforce 
the inherent value of the particular interests in and of itself, regardless of any financial loss 
or injury to feelings.186  Indeed, one can add that vindication has been recognized even 
beyond vindicatory torts.  In Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust, a case of 
wrongful birth due to negligent administering of sterilization by the defendant, the House of 
Lords awarded a substantial damage of £15,000 to recognize the claimant’s loss of the 
opportunity “to live her life in the way that she wished and planned.”187 Lord Bingham 
expressly stated that the damages were neither compensatory, nominal nor derisory, but 
were intended to “afford some measure of recognition of the wrong done.”188  In another 
context, Pearce and Halson argued that there were occasions where vindicatory damages, 
which were rights-based, were awarded to provide a measure of recognition of the violation 
of the claimant’s right when other curial measures were inadequate, and the damages were 
neither compensatory nor restitutionary. 189    
 
Following this line of argument, Varuhas argued for the adoption of a vindicatory, 
tort-based approach to human rights damages. He argued that this vindicatory function in 
torts shapes the approach to compensatory damages so that damages are generally 
recoverable for the normative injury to one’s underlying interests, notwithstanding whether 
the claimant suffers any negative psychological, physical, emotional or economic effects as a 
consequence of the wrong.  The familiar tort principles provided an established and 
reasonably coherent and principled approach that would promote coherence and 
consistency across domestic law.190  Given that current remedies meet the purposes of 
vindication, and that vindicatory damages perform similar functions to exemplary damages, 
vindicatory damages are otiose and should be rejected.191 Varuhas further argues that an 
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administrative law paradigm in public law that focuses on abuse of powers will not be 
conducive to the development of human rights damages, which is the primary focus of 
tort.192  This paradigm would bring in consideration the balancing of various public interests, 
and as a result, the normative right to conventional damages in tort is reduced to a 
discretion, and public law considerations are allowed to creep into the process of 
determination of damages, which considerations would likely result in a lesser amount of 
damages to be awarded in public law than in tort.  He attributed the failure to extend the 
vindicatory torts to human rights damages to an outmoded conception of public/ private 
law divide.   
 
 
3.1.4 A Rejoinder 
 
This is a thought-provoking thesis and a short paper of this nature would not do 
justice to the argument.  A few observations would be made.  First, according to Varuhas, 
the core features of vindicatory torts are (1) damages are as of right; (2) a wide range of 
damages are available, including compensatory damage, non-compensatory damages such 
as nominal damages, gain-based damages, and exemplary or punitive damages.  Apart from 
exemplary damages and nominal damages which will be separately considered below, it is 
not in serious dispute that the other types of damages, which are either loss-based or gain-
based, would continue to be available under a public law claim.  In Ward, MacLachlin CJ 
referred to the compensatory function of damages.  “Compensation” is used in a general 
sense and includes both personal loss (physical, psychological and pecuniary), as well as 
harm to intangible interests (distress, humiliation, embarrassment and anxiety). 193   
Although it is not expressly mentioned in the judgment, there is no reason why gain-based 
restitutionary loss would not be included.  The court also emphasized that in these areas 
guidance could be drawn from the common law.  Likewise, in Baigent’s case and Taunoa, 
the court referred to an amount of damages that was in addition to the common law 
awards.  Vindicatory damages are additional to and not a substitute for other types of 
damages.  These other types of damages are broadly compensatory in nature and nothing 
could be gained by labeling them as tort-based damages.  To the extent that they also serve 
the function of vindication, the term “vindication” is used in a general sense, which does not 
take the matter too far.   When existing remedies are adequate, a further award of 
vindicatory damages is in any event unnecessary.  To the extent that vindication of the 
constitutional rights is already recognized in vindicatory tort, it makes little difference 
whether the approach in vindicatory torts is adopted or that damages awarded in 
vindicatory torts should be taken into account in awarding vindicatory damages in public 
law claims.  They may take different forms, but the end result is the same. 
 
Secondly, a tort-based approach to damages may be too narrow.  Varuhas’ argument 
rests heavily on vindicatory torts, such as trespass, false imprisonment, defamation, assault 
and battery, which, apart from defamation, are about deprivation of personal liberty.  Not 
all violations of human rights would constitute an actionable tort.  A violation of one’s right 
to privacy by covert surveillance does not necessarily involve any breach of tort principles, 
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as Malone shows.  A failure to disclose material information to an accused in a criminal trial 
may not support a claim for malicious prosecution. The court is reluctant to extend the duty 
of care in the exercise of public duties.  Many violations of human rights, such as free 
speech, peaceful assembly, right to vote, may not be covered by any corresponding tort 
action. Tort action is of limited assistance when the encroachment is statutory in nature.  It 
is not easy to disentangle damages from liability, and it would be difficult to apply a tort-
based approach to damages when tortious liability is not established in the first place.   Even 
when a tort is established, the interest protected by tort may not be the same as that in 
public law. A colorful example was given by Gibbs CJ in Merest v Harvey:194 
 
 “Suppose a gentleman has a paved walk in his paddock, before his window, and that 
a man intrudes and walks up and down before the window of his house, and looks in 
while the owner is at dinner.  Is the trespasser to be permitted to say, ‘here is a 
halfpenny for you, which is the full extent of all the mischief I have done.’  Would 
that be a compensation?  I cannot say that it would be.” 
 
Trespass to land serves to protect the interest against unlawful interference with 
possession. If privacy is protected, it is an incidental result.  Thus, it is arguable that 
damages awarded for trespass to land should not be the same as damages awarded for an 
invasion of one’s right to private life under a constitutional claim.  Of course, there is close 
resemblance with tort in the area of deprivation of personal liberty, especially when the 
deprivation is malicious, outrageous or contumelious.  Yet the bilateral corrective justice 
approach in tort law is less equipped to deal with situations where there is no malice or ill-
intentioned conduct, but the violation is a result of mere maladministration or systemic 
failures.195  
 
The requirement of causation in private law may pose another issue for extending 
tort principles to assessing damages in public law.  While it must be right for a claimant for 
constitutional damages to prove that the loss was caused by the breach, it is arguable 
whether the same but-for test in private law is appropriate for considering public law 
damages.  This question has not been decided, although MacLachlin CJ has cast doubt on 
the appropriateness of the but-for test.196  Even if the but-for test for causation in private 
law is adopted, this test has limited application for awarding damages for purposes other 
than compensation.  Vindication is to re-assert the primary importance of the constitutional 
rights and to restore public confidence in the efficacy of the constitutional protection.  Thus, 
it is not easy to apply a but-for test, or at least one without substantial modification in the 
context of vindication.   
 
Apart from ensuring a just outcome for a claimant where no other remedy is 
available, Pearce and Halson argued that vindicatory damages, in the context of contract, 
are likely to be relevant “where the breach causes no loss within the conventional meaning 
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of loss, where an award of compensatory damages would be oppressive as regards the 
defendant, and where an award of compensatory damages will not be an adequate remedy 
because all or part of the loss caused by the breach is not loss for which the defendant is 
liable to the claimant.”197 Vindicatory damages would also be appropriate to ensure that no 
undue liability is imposed on the defendant.  In Chester v Afshar,198 a case on failure to 
advise of certain risk in a proposed operation, the House of Lords held that the claim failed 
as the defendant’s breach had not been the effective cause of the injury and it had not been 
shown that the breach had increased the risk of the injury.  However, the House of Lords 
also believed that the claimant should receive some damages for the failure to give the 
warning.  Pearce and Halson contended that an outright denial of damages would fail to 
vindicate the right to be warned, but the imposition of liability to compensate for loss which 
did not arise from the breach was unduly onerous.  Thus, a better solution would have been 
to award vindicatory damages of a fair and reasonable amount to recognize the wrong.199 
 
Thirdly, to the extent that there are concurrent liabilities in a tort claim and a 
constitutional claim, it must be right that the damages recoverable under either action 
should be comparable, as a matter of fairness and equity. Otherwise, the value of the right, 
such as personal liberty, would be regarded as of less worth in one action than the other.  
Yet it does not follow that vindicatory damages in constitutional claims should be rejected 
simply because they are available in torts.  The reverse is equally true.  If damages for 
vindication under vindicatory torts are recognised and available, it is difficult to argue why 
damages for vindication under constitutional claims for the same wrong should not be 
recognized or available, so long as there is not double recovery under both causes of action.  
If they are of the same nature and for the same purpose, the objection to vindicatory 
damages in constitutional claim is one of form rather than substance.  The only serious 
objections are then double recovery, which can be easily taken care of, or redundancy, 
which rests on the proposition that the principles for awarding damages for vindicatory 
purposes in tort law are clear, coherent and apposite for remedying a constitutional wrong.  
As shown above, this may be true in vindicatory torts, but it is far from clear once we move 
beyond this area.  
 
Fourthly, it was argued that under a tort-based approach, damages are normative, 
whereas damages are discretionary and may be reduced by public law considerations in a 
public law.  A distinction may have to be drawn between compensatory and vindicatory 
damages.  For compensatory damages, which are loss-based or gain-based, it is right that 
there should not be any room for public interest considerations to reduce the damages 
recoverable.  While some of the categorical statements in Taunoa may suggest the contrary, 
it has been argued above that the judgment has to be read in the context that common law 
claims were not in issue in that case.  A careful reading suggests that the public law 
considerations were relevant only in vindicatory damages. As McLachlin CJ cautioned, a just 
and appropriate remedy in public law has to be just and fair to all parties, including the 
State, when the purpose of vindication is to mark society’s disapproval.200   With this 
purpose in mind, it would be difficult to imagine that the conduct of the State officials, 
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including any step taken to remedy the wrong or to address systemic issues, would not be 
relevant in assessing the amount of damages, even under vindicatory torts.  Henceforth, 
there may not be many distinctions between vindication in vindicatory torts and vindicatory 
damages in constitutional claims.   
 
A variation of this argument is that if damages in public law can be reduced by public 
interest consideration, why could this not be done in vindicatory torts?  And why would this 
stop at vindicatory torts and not apply to other torts?  This “thin end of the wedge” 
argument is further dealt with below.201  It suffices to point out here that part of the 
justification lies in the public/private law divide.  It is true that many constitutional rights are 
recognized and protected in private law well before the advent of public law, which, at least 
in English common law, was not formally introduced until O’Reilly v Mackman in the 1980s.  
Nor has the demarcation between public law and private law ever been clear.202 Private law 
and public law form different parts of the same legal system and share basic legal principles, 
values and objectives.  They complement one another, and cross-pollinate the development 
of each other.  A rigid distinction between private law and public law is untenable.  Yet it 
would be equally artificial to obliterate any distinction between these two spheres either. A 
constitution or a Bill of Rights binds the State only.  Their application to inter-citizen 
litigation remains controversial and is limited in scope.  Thus, there is nothing unusual that a 
public law action will lie against the State whereas the same action could not lie against an 
individual in a similar situation. The nature of public law claim requires the court to take into 
account public interest and mandates a discretionary nature of damages, and the different 
nature of the claims points to the inappropriateness of extending a public law approach to a 
tort claim.203 
 
Fifthly, it was said that public law damages would result in a lower amount of award 
than tort damages.  While it is accepted that tort law has much to offer in assessing 
vindicatory damages, it is not obvious that tort law would necessarily tend to give a more 
generous awards.204  There are no doubt cases on both sides of the line.  As shown above, 
an express recognition of vindicatory damages has indeed in some cases resulted in 
additional damages that would not have been awarded under the common law.205  There 
are no doubt cases where the award was simply too low, whether they were made under 
tort or public law.206  In this regard, one has to be careful in making any comparison.  It is 
inappropriate to compare the amount of vindicatory damages with tort awards when tort 
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awards were not available in the first place.  Comparison is also difficult when the court 
simply makes a global award without breaking down the compensation and the vindicatory 
elements, or it may be misleading if vindicatory damages in public law are to compare with 
compensatory damages in tort.  With the limited number of cases on public law damages, it 
is probably too early to draw any conclusive finding. 
 
Finally, it is accepted that there is considerable force in the argument that the 
amount of damages awarded in tort and in a public law claim should be comparable when 
the violation constitutes a concurrent action in tort and in public law.  However, as Varuhas 
himself has qualified, the vindicatory function of tort may not always be appreciated, or may 
not assume equal prominence in all torts.  By lumping the function of vindication in 
conventional damages, the function of vindication could easily be undermined or ignored in 
a tort-based approach.  The Canadian approach on vindicatory damages has the distinct 
advantage of bringing the function of vindication to the fore.  By expressly acknowledging 
the separate functions of compensation and vindication, it requires the courts to address 
these different functions in the award of public law damages separately, and reach a 
decision that provides just and appropriate remedy in the circumstances of the case.  As 
Witzleb and Carroll point out, the advantages of the express recognition of vindicatory 
damages are that (1) they reduce the need to stretch the bounds of compensation or 
restitution to explain non-punitive awards; (2) they can be awarded without resorting to 
punishment, particularly where exemplary damages are unavailable; and (3) they ensure the 
availability of a remedy that is sufficiently robust and flexible to make good on the infringed 
rights.207 
 
Lord Collins refers to the award of nominal damages.  While the award of nominal 
damages affirms that a right has been violated, it hardly serves any vindication purpose.  To 
the extent that declaratory relief constitutes sufficient vindication, the award of nominal 
damages does not serve any additional vindication purpose.  To the claimant, nominal 
damages are unlikely to be able to provide adequate satisfaction to vindicate the rights that 
were violated.  On the contrary, it may achieve the precisely opposite effect if it conveys a 
derisory message that the rights do not deserve protection or that the violation is a mere 
technicality or that the claimant deserved what has been meted out to him. 
 
This leaves only exemplary damages, which are said to serve the same function as 
vindicatory damages and this forms a major ground for rejecting vindicatory damages.  It is 
argued below that there are both conceptual and practical problems of treating exemplary 
damages as a sufficient substitute for vindicatory damages. 
 
 
3.2 Vindicatory damages and Exemplary Damages  
 
Another main objection to vindicatory damages is that they overlap with exemplary or 
punitive damages.  As exemplary damages and vindicatory damages cannot be awarded 
concurrently, this reinforces the argument that the purposes of the latter is already served 
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by the availability of the former.208   Lord Nicholls stated in Kuddus v Chief Constable of 
Leicestershire Constabulary:209  
 
“The availability of exemplary damages has played a significant role in buttressing 
civil liberties, in claims for false imprisonment and wrongful arrest. From time to 
time cases do arise where awards of compensatory damages are perceived as 
inadequate … The nature of the defendant's conduct calls for a further response 
from the courts. On occasion conscious wrongdoing by a defendant is so outrageous, 
his disregard of the plaintiff's rights so contumelious, that something more is needed 
to show that the law will not tolerate such behaviour. Without an award of 
exemplary damages, justice will not have been done. Exemplary damages, as a 
remedy of last resort, fill what would otherwise be a regrettable lacuna.” 
 
In the first place, it is clear, unlike exemplary damages, that the purpose of 
vindicatory damages is not to punish the wrongdoer.  As Lord Hope, in Inmiss v Attorney 
General of St Christopher and Nevis, observed, it was inappropriate in public law to punish 
the executive, and hence terms like “exemplary damages” or “punitive damages” are best 
avoided:210 
 
“Although such an award is likely in financial terms to cover much the same ground 
as an award by way of punishment in the sense of retribution, punishment in that 
sense is not its object.  The expressions “punitive damages” or “exemplary damages” 
are therefore best avoided.  Allowance must be made for the importance of the right 
and the gravity of the breach in the assessment of any award.  Its purpose is to 
recognize the importance of the right to the individual, not to punish the executive.  
It involves an assertion that the right is a valuable one as to whose enforcement the 
complainant has an interest.  Any award of damages is bound, to some extent at 
least, to act as a deterrent against further breaches.  The fact that it may be 
expected to do so is something to which it is proper to have regard.” 
 
This is more than a semantic response.  While there is no doubt that certain 
objectives overlap between exemplary damages and vindicatory damages, the focus of 
vindicatory damages is not on the wrongdoer’s culpability, but the assertion of the primacy 
of the claimant’s rights in society.  It is the constitutional significance of the Bill of Rights and 
the community’s interest in ensuring that those rights are heedfully respected by the State 
that justify the need to vindicate the rights.211 Some may argue that this is just a matter of 
emphasis.  Four points could be made in reply. Firstly, if the violation of a constitutional 
right does not support an actionable tort, there is no basis for awarding tort damages, let 
alone exemplary damages.  Secondly, even if an actionable tort is established, exemplary 
damages may not available even though the injury to the constitutional rights is significant 
or serious.  Thirdly, it is possible to extend exemplary damages to situations where such 
damages would not have been available under tort law, yet in such cases it is artificial to 
regard such damages are still “exemplary”.  It would make no difference whether the 
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damages are called exemplary or vindicatory.  The objection to vindicatory damages would 
then be one of form rather than substance.  Finally, in those situations where there is an 
overlap between vindicatory damages and exemplary damages, no injustice would result, as 
there would be no double recovery.  Indeed, a better approach is to replace exemplary 
damages by vindicatory damages in public law.  Let me elaborate. 
 
Firstly, it has already been argued that tort law and public law are not coterminous.  
Not all violations of constitutional law would constitute a tortious wrong, and vice versa.  In 
general, tort law is developed in the context of rights and obligations between private 
individuals.  Save in exceptional circumstances or when there are statutory obligations, tort 
law in general does not impose liabilities for omissions.  When it is extended to public 
authorities, basically the same principles apply.  By contrast, public law is concerned with 
the powers of the State, and the extensive positive duties imposed in public law means that 
public law liabilities extend beyond the reach of private tort law.  In general, there is no duty 
in tort law to provide benefits, nor any duty of care in the exercise of public functions.212  
The Malone case is a classic example where tort law was reluctant to impose liabilities.213  
Even in the area of commission, the extent of liabilities is not the same. Tort law is designed 
to resolve conflicts between rights-holders, whereas public law is designed to supervise the 
exercise of public powers.  Public law is more ready to impose liabilities on the State 
because of the power of the State over individuals, and hence it may provide remedy for 
systemic failures or maladministration when the common law of tort refuses to do so.214   In 
Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust,215 a parent has no cause of action against another private 
person for bereavement arising from the death of their adult child, but he could bring an 
action and claim damages against the State under the Human Rights Act for the State’s 
failure to protect his child’s right to life.  When a common law remedy is simply not 
available because the wrong is not established, as in the Henry case, or when civil liability of 
the State is excluded, as in Baigent’s case, or when remedy in the common law does not 
offer adequate protection, as in the Ward case, there is no reason why damages should not 
be awarded in public law if this is appropriate and just in the circumstances of the case.  This 
should not restrict the discretion of the court to award just and appropriate remedy by 
excluding any appropriate form of remedy.   
 
Secondly, English courts have traditionally been skeptical about exemplary damages 
and as a result, exemplary damages are available only in rather restricted circumstances.  In 
the leading case of Rookes v Bernard,216 exemplary damages were confined to three narrow 
categories: (1) deliberate malpractice by a public officer or authority; (2) conduct committed 
with deliberate intent that the profits from it would exceed any possible compensatory 
damages; or (3) where a statute expressly provided for punitive damages.  Their availability 
was further restricted by the Court of Appeal in AB v South West Water Services Ltd,217 
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which held that exemplary damages would only be available under those causes of action 
that existed at the time of Rookes v Bernard.   While AB v South West Water Services Ltd was 
repealed by the House of Lords in Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, 
and while Lord Nicholls was prepared to recognize the role of exemplary damages in 
buttressing civil liberties, and he advocated for a more liberal approach to the award of 
exemplary damages, such damages should still be confined to occasions where the 
wrongdoing of a defendant was so “outrageous” or “contumelious”, and that exemplary 
damages should be the “last resort”.218 The purpose of exemplary damages is clearly to 
punish the tortfeasors for their outrageous conduct. Thus, they may not be available when a 
violation of constitutional rights is serious but the violation was not malicious or capricious.  
In Ward, the court accepted that the strip search was not ill-intended, malicious, high-
handed or oppressive, but a result of insensitivity to Charter rights.219 The court in Henry 
found that the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the claimants in a criminal trial 
was not done with malice. 220 In Welfare v Kate, the court found the delay was not malicious 
but endemic in nature.221  In Dunlea, the court found that the treatment of the claimants 
was not outrageous or high-handed and expressly rejected the award of exemplary 
damages. Nonetheless, in all these cases the courts upheld the amount of damages to 
vindicate the rights violated. 222 There are bound to be circumstances that vindicatory 
damages may be called for in public law in order to provide an effective remedy, but 
exemplary damages would not be available for similar situations in private law.   
 
There is of course the option of expanding the scope and availability of exemplary 
damages.  In Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police,223 Lord Scott suggested that 
vindicatory damages could be awarded in an action for trespass when the purpose of 
vindication cannot be fulfilled by compensatory awards.  Yet he spoke with a lone voice.  
Lord Bingham and Lord Rodger did not mention any additional award.  Lord Carswell (in 
dissent) expressly rejected vindicatory damages in tort, and Lord Neuberger joined the 
dissent on the ground that mere vindication was insufficient to justify the pursuit of a claim 
for trespass.  In a later case, the distinction between tort and HRA was again reinforced.224  
The existence of distinct remedies and limitation periods were among the reasons for not 
maintaining a closer integration between the two actions.  Besides, the Law Commission has 
recommended an extension of exemplary damages to any tort or equitable wrong case 
where the defendant’s conduct “showed a deliberate and outrageous disregard of the 
plaintiff’s rights and [when] other remedies… would be inadequate to punish the defendant 
for his conduct.”225   The recommendation was not accepted because there was no clear 
consensus on whether exemplary damages should be abolished or retained.226   Further, an 
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expansion of the scope and availability of exemplary damages to public law would mean (1) 
the objection to vindicatory damages in public law would become one of form rather than 
substance; and (2) it will lead to the same objection of uncertainty in the law that Lord 
Dyson was concerned.  Whereas it is possible to confine vindicatory damages to public law, 
an expansion of exemplary damages in tort law in one area would make it more difficult to 
resist its extension to other areas of private law.  As the current law now stands, there 
seems to be no cause for optimism that the court is prepared to expand the scope of 
exemplary damages.  
 
In any event, insofar as vindicatory damages serve the same purpose as exemplary 
damages, a simple reply is that it does not matter since the principle against double 
recovery will prevent any excessive award.  In Falwasser v Attorney General, Stevens J, 
following Taunoa, made an award of NZ$30,000 to vindicate the public law rights “to 
cement the Court’s and society’s denunciation of the conduct in question”.227  The court 
undertook a separate exercise of considering exemplary damages (if available), and, not 
surprisingly, came to the same amount of award, which was to be reduced to nil so as to 
prevent double recovery.  Given that it is not the purpose of public law to punish the State, 
it may be better simply to deny the applicability of exemplary damages and substitute them 
with vindicatory damages whenever appropriate. 
 
 
3.3 Uncertainty in the Law 
 
Another objection to vindicatory damages is a kind of a “thin end of a wedge” argument.  
Once the unruly horse of vindicatory damages is unleashed, it will take other aspects of 
private law for a proverbial ride, resulting in uncertainty in the law.  In Lumba (Congo) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department,228 Lord Collins expressed his second objection 
to vindicatory damages as follows:229 
 
 “The implications of awarding vindicatory damages in the present case would be far 
reaching.  Undesirable uncertainty would result.  If they were awarded here, then 
they could in principle be awarded in any case involving a battery or false 
imprisonment by an arm of the state.  Indeed, why limit it to such torts? And why 
limit it to torts committed by the state?  I see no justification for letting such unruly 
horse loose on our law.”  
 
Yet this objection is precisely the reason why it is preferable to develop vindicatory 
damages in public law independently of tort law, as it does not follow from the availability 
of vindicatory damages in public law that the same damages would have to be made 
available to private litigants in private law.  Public law and private law serve fundamentally 
different purposes.  A public law claim is only directed at and will only affect the State and 
public authorities. 230  Private law applies to State as well as individuals.  The bipolar nature 
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of private law, as succinctly illustrated by Hammond J in Manga v Attorney General, means 
that “the sort of factors influencing remedial choice in a private law suit (which include 
plaintiff autonomy; economic efficiency; the relative severity of the remedy; the nature of 
the right to be supported; difficulties of calculation; the effect of a remedy on third parties; 
the practicability of enforcement; and the conduct of the parties) are not wide enough for a 
case involving a violation of a constitutional character.”231  Conversely, while it is possible to 
extend tortious principles in light of public law concerns, this may not always be possible or 
appropriate.  As Hardie-Boys J observed in Baigent’s case, it may be inappropriate to extend 
a duty of care only to those classes who are subject to the Bill of Rights, yet quite 
unwarranted to extend it universally, or even to violations by private individuals.232 
 
Additionally, as the primary purpose of private law remedies is compensatory, the 
claimant is entitled to damages as of right.  Conversely, damages in public law are 
discretionary.  In assessing vindicatory damages in public law, the court has to balance a 
range of countervailing factors, including adequacy of alternative remedies, concern for 
effective governance, and gravity of the violation.  Good governance may take different 
forms.  On the one hand, respect for fundamental rights is always part of good governance.  
On the other hand, the Government should not be deterred of carrying out their lawful 
duties of exercising policy-making discretion.233  Thus, in general, vindicatory damages are 
not “appropriate and just” without a minimum threshold of gravity.  What that standard is a 
question that may vary from case to case, so again private law thresholds and defences may 
offer guidance.  The overriding consideration is one of proportionality.  Thus, in Henry v 
British Columbia,234 the Supreme Court held that it was not appropriate to require malice in 
a case of non-disclosure of evidence in criminal prosecution.  This standard of malice is 
firmly rooted in the tort of malicious prosecution, which has a distinctive history and 
purpose.  It was not appropriate when, unlike the decision to prosecute which involves high 
policy content, no core prosecutorial discretion was involved as disclosure of relevant 
information in a criminal prosecution was a constitutional obligation.  Hence, the motive to 
withhold information was immaterial and therefore an onerous threshold to insulate the 
State from judicial scrutiny or civil damages was unwarranted. Even when damages are to 
be awarded in public law, the court has to balance various competing interests to assess the 
quantum.  The amount of compensation awarded has to be sufficient to reflect the 
importance of the rights violated. A nominal compensation will only diminish the value of 
the rights, whereas a substantial amount may adversely affect other public interests. 235 
These balancing exercises, and the ensuing uncertainty, are typical in public law but are not 
necessarily relevant in private law litigation between individuals. 
 
 
3.4 Arbitrariness to assess vindicatory damages 
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A further objection to vindicatory damages is that the award is arbitrary.  In the first place, 
the fact that it is difficult to assess vindicatory damages is not a reason to deny its existence.  
Non-pecuniary damages, aggravated damages or exemplary damages in private law are 
equally difficult to assess, and the assessment will become more consistent once the court is 
able to develop the precedents.  The exercise is not an exact science, and the appropriate 
amount for vindication purposes has to be determined by reference to the social, historical 
and legal contexts of the particular society.   
 
In a tort action, the principle for assessing damages is restitutio in integrum, that is, 
putting the parties into the position as if the wrong had not been committed.  This concept 
has also been accepted by the European Court of Human Rights, and there is no doubt that 
the approach taken by the common law in similar circumstances will be relevant if not also 
significant when determining the scope of an appropriate remedy in public law. However, 
there is no reason that damages in public law has to be confined or limited by what is 
available in analogous cases at common law or in equity, given the public dimension of a 
public law action.236   
 
For exemplary damages, the Law Commission has recommended that they should be 
of a moderate amount because a substantial punitive amount should fall within the domain 
of criminal law, which provides better safeguards than in civil process, and that punitive 
damages should not result in a windfall to the claimant, which might financially compromise 
other valuable or essential public services.237  These concerns deserve equal consideration 
in awarding vindicatory damages. 
 
On the amount of vindicatory damages, while there are isolated dicta to the effect 
that the award could be substantial, the experience of those jurisdictions where vindicatory 
damages have been awarded shows that the concern for excessive awards is unfounded.  
The amounts awarded were moderate, and were nowhere near anything that would 
significantly compromise financially other public services.   
 
Emerging judicial consensus is that damages must not be extravagant, yet they must 
be sufficiently significant so as not to trivialize the breach.  The determination of an 
appropriate amount would of course be an act of art, and some latitude, as well as 
reasonable disagreement, would have to be expected.  In vindicating the constitutional 
rights, the amount would have to be such that a reasonable claimant would feel that it is 
worth making the claim, taking into account the stress and perhaps the cost involved.  The 
court will have to assess what amount reasonable and responsible members of that society 
will feel comfortable, taking into account all the circumstances, including the nature of the 
infringed right, the nature of the breach, the effect on the victim and the other redress 
which has been ordered.   A nominal award usually benefits neither the society nor the 
individual.  In this regard, the helpful judgment of Blanchard J in Taunoa deserves closer 
attention than it has hitherto received.238  If there is a successful concurrent tort claim, the 
damages awarded under the tort claim would have to be taken into consideration in 
assessing damages under the public law claim.  In such cases, a further award of damages in 
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public law would be unnecessary and would not serve any useful purpose.  If there is no 
available claim (or other adequate remedies), non-pecuniary damages would have to be 
assessed and the amount would be dependent on the nature and the gravity of the breach 
as well as its duration and any attempt by the state to take remedial action.  Some breaches, 
such as a violation of fair hearing, would not normally require non-pecuniary damages other 
than quashing the impugned decision. Whereas some breaches, such as torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, would normally require an additional 
amount of damages to reflect social abhorrence of such official conduct, taking into account 
also the intention behind the impugned conduct and the duration of the breach.  While the 
amount is not to compensate for hurt feelings, it has to be an amount that the claimant 
would not reasonably feel that the award is trivializing the breach.  It will also have “to 
reflect the ways in which the State has acknowledged the wrongdoing; whether, and with 
what speed, it has brought to an end the wrongful conduct and put in place measures to 
prevent reoccurrence; and whether it has publicly apologized to the victim in appropriate 
terms.”239  
 
It should also be recognized that “an award of Bill of Rights Act damages does not 
perform the same economic or legal function as common law damages or equitable 
compensation; nor should it be allowed to perform the function of filling perceived gaps in 
the coverage of the general law, notably in this country in the area of personal injury.”240  
The same principle applies when the breach is systemic in nature.  Blanchard J cautioned 
that in such case, the amount of damages should be no more than the sum which is 
appropriate for that case, and should not be inflated to reflect the effect of the systemic 
failure upon other persons, for they may choose to make their own claims.241   
 
 On the question of windfall, this is partly taken care of by the fact that the award is 
only moderate, and partly by the factors that the court has to take into account in 
determining the amount, including the nature, the gravity and the duration of the violation 
of constitutional rights.  A more conceptual challenge is that if the purpose is to vindicate a 
wrong and not to compensate the claimant, why should the damages be payable to the 
claimant who would arguably receive a windfall?  To some extent the same argument could 
have been made against exemplary damages.  It should also not be overlooked that the 
claimant is both a victim as well as a member of the public.  To the extent that the violation 
happened to him as a member of the public, he does not receive a windfall if the damages 
represent public abhorrence of what has happened to him.  Public law is not just about 
what the claimant is to receive, which is taken care of by, inter alia, compensatory damages, 
but also about what the defendant has to pay for the wrong.  As Blanchard J advised, the 
general level of damages should not vary significantly depending upon the character of the 
particular victim.  Claimants who have been maltreated in a similar way with similar 
consequences should receive comparable amounts without weight being placed upon their 
individual records.  Rather, the variance should depend upon the severity and duration of 
breach in each case.242 
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It has been argued that if the purpose of the award is to vindicate the right on behalf 
of the public, the amount should not be different in different cases.   In his prominent work, 
Dr Harvey McGregor took the view that damages were all about the consequences of 
wrongdoing.  If there were no consequences, there could not be anything more than 
nominal damages.  Therefore, there is no role for vindicatory damages if its only role is to 
vindicate the rights.243  In other words, a violation of a constitutional right per se without 
consequences should not receive any damages other than nominal.  Similarly, James 
Edelman argued that the goal of damages is to ameliorate the consequences of wrongdoing, 
whereas vindicatory damages were not concerned with consequences but the violation 
itself.  He asked rhetorically, “why an award of further damages is needed even when the 
law has responded to all consequences of a wrong, including sending any required message 
about the impropriety of the wrongful act by an award of nominal or exemplary 
damages.”244  This begs the question whether the law has responded to all consequences of 
a wrong.  The argument assumes that existing remedies are adequate, yet it is precisely in 
situations where available remedies, including declaratory relief and nominal damages, are 
inadequate to reflect the gravity of the wrong done that vindicatory damages are justified. It 
also underlines an important issue of whether a constitutional right itself has some intrinsic 
value so that its violation would per se attract damages irrespective of any other loss. 
Edelman’s response is then how different awards for vindicatory damages could be justified 
if the purpose of the damages was to vindicate the right itself, and not the consequences of 
the violation.245  In reply, Varuhas argued while the right was the same, vindication was 
about the underlying interests, and the extent the interests was violated may depend on the 
gravity of the violation, the manner of violation, and the consequences to the claimant. 246  
Another way of putting it is that vindicatory damages are to reflect public abhorrence of the 
violation, and the extent of public abhorrence will depend on the nature, the manner, and 
the gravity of the violations. Hence, different awards would be justified.  This seems to be 
consistent with the jurisprudence in Canada and New Zealand. 
 
In summary, the assessment of vindicatory damages is not as arbitrary as it is 
suggested.  Just like any exercise in assessment of damages, absolute certainty is impossible.  
On the other hand, a number of guiding principles have gradually emerged: (1) the remedy 
has to be just and appropriate; vindicatory damages are not always necessary and are to be 
awarded only when other remedies are inadequate to satisfy the objectives of damages; (2) 
the purpose of damages is to publicly vindicate the right, and not to punish the State or its 
officials; (3) the quantum is to be guided by the seriousness of the breach, the impact of the 
breach on the claimant, and the seriousness of the state misconduct.  Large award is 
generally inappropriate, but the award has to be sufficiently meaningful to represent a 
serious response to the breach and the objectives of compensation, upholding the 
constitutional values and deterring future breaches; and (4) given the shared objectives of 
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vindicatory damages in public law and exemplary damages in private law, the established 
principles in tort law may still be relevant as a guide, so long as there is no double recovery. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Four different approaches to constitutional damages are discernable: the autonomous 
public law rights-based approach in New Zealand that rejects the relevance of tort law; the 
composite approach in Canada that retains the autonomous nature of public law claims but 
draws upon private law principles whenever possible; a parallel approach in South Africa 
that gives prominence to private law principles but leaves public law damages available as 
an exception; and the “mirror approach” with Strasbourg jurisprudence coupled with a 
rejection of vindicatory damages in the United Kingdom.247  Notwithstanding these 
differences, more recent developments suggest that, with the exception of the United 
Kingdom, there is an emerging trend of converging towards the composite approach in 
Canada, which is a compromise between a strictly public law approach and a strictly private 
law tort approach.  This is a desirable development. 
 
It is argued that the Canadian approach, with minor modifications, would provide a 
structured and principled approach to public law damages.  A breach of constitutional rights 
in an independent wrong, for which the court has to provide just and appropriate remedies.  
The courts have a wide discretion to fashion just and appropriate remedies.  It is undesirable 
to reduce the discretion by straitjacketing damages into existing categories.  The Canadian 
approach recognizes three main functions of damages, that of compensation, vindication 
and deterrence, and builds in a balancing approach to addressing countervailing factors, 
with a provision that the burden of establishing the countervailing factors, consistent with 
human rights jurisprudence on restriction of rights, is shifted to the State.  The 
compensation function will ensure that the court will not overlook one of the most 
important objectives of constitutional claims, namely, to protect individual rights, whereas 
the vindication and deterrence functions ensures that the courts will address the public 
dimension of human rights and to affirm their importance in society.  While affirming 
constitutional damages as stand-alone damages, the courts stress that it is desirable to draw 
guidance from tort principles in assessing damages whenever appropriate.  This approach 
allows the court to fashion the most appropriate remedies in the circumstances of each 
case, without disturbing the principles of tort law, which applies not only to the State but 
also among individuals.  Simultaneously, it allows cross-pollination of both private law and 
public law, by providing the necessary degree of certainty of the law and yet enabling the 
court to freely develop both branches of law.  This approach addresses the shortcomings of 
both an entirely separate and autonomous public law approach and a full assimilation of 
tort law and public law remedies, and goes a long way to address some of the objections to 
vindicatory damages.  The modifications/clarifications are (1) compensatory damages 
should not be reduced by public law consideration, and should normally be awarded; (2) 
vindicatory damages are discretionary and should normally be awarded only when other 
remedies are insufficient to vindicate the constitutional rights.  It is awarded to reflect the 
public disapproval of the violation and is additional to the compensatory damages; (3) the 
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burden of establishing countervailing factors to reduce the amount of vindicatory damages 
should rest squarely on the State; and (4) there is no reason in principle why damages 
should not be awarded for a violation caused by systemic failure, the judiciary, or the 
Legislature, although it would be easier for the State to refute an award if independence of 
the judiciary is threatened. 
 
A constitution has been described as a living tree that is capable of growth.  It has 
not been seriously argued that substantive constitutional rights should be developed in the 
same way as similar rights protected by private law.  So, why should damages be different 
then?  Vindicatory damages have its place in public law, as a primary objective in public law 
is to uphold and vindicate constitutional rights, given the sui generis nature of constitutional 
rights.  Their purpose is not to punish the executive, but rather to affirm the sanctity of 
constitutional rights.  They have to be “appropriate and just”, and this formulation allows 
the court to balance public interest with the award – on the one hand to ensure that the 
level of damages, taking holistically, are sufficient to reaffirm the unacceptability and to 
mark social disapproval of the violations, and on the other hand, to balance the damages 
against a whole range of public law considerations, including its impact on good governance. 
While vindicatory damages bear similarity with exemplary damages, they are different.  
Exemplary damages are punitive; vindicatory damages are affirmative.  Exemplary damages 
focus on the conduct of the offender; vindicatory damages focus on the rights violated.  
Exemplary damages look to the past conduct; vindicatory damages are forward-looking, 
community-based and structural.  Instead of tying the hands of the judiciary to the rather 
restrictive principles for granting exemplary damages, the judiciary must be given a broad 
discretion to fashion remedies that are most appropriate in the context. 248  Thus, it is 
argued that exemplary damages should be excluded from public law damages.  Vindicatory 
damages, which should be confined to public law, may play a similar role as exemplary 
damages in private law, and would no doubt draw upon the principles governing the award 
of exemplary damages.  As time passes, they may be developed in different directions.  By 
treating constitutional damages as sui generis, it would allow the courts to further develop 
public law remedies with the assistance of but not constrained by the existing confines of 
the existing principles in private law. 
 
 Ultimately, a fundamental difference underlying the diverse approaches to damages is 
whether the function of damages is to compensate for the consequences of a wrong, which 
is typical of that of tort law, or whether the wrong is the violation itself, which is regarded as 
the compensable injury that deserves vindication.  Should vindicatory damages be rejected 
as an unruly horse that threatens to unseat legal certainty?  When the European concept of 
proportionality was first introduced into the common law, it was greeted with skepticism for 
being unprincipled, subjective and arbitrary.  Likewise, public law damages are still in their 
early days of development.  As we embark on this new journey, it could not be more 
                                                     
248 As Richardson J succinctly summed up in Martin v Tauranga District Court, [1995] 2 NZLR 419 at 428: “… 
the objective is to vindicate human rights, not to punish or discipline those responsible for the breach.  The 
choice of remedies should be directed to the values underlying the particular right.  The remedy or remedies 
granted should be proportional to the particular breach and should have regard to other aspects of the public 
interest.”  See also Opkaluba, “Vindicatory approach to the award of constitutional and public law damages: 
contemporary Commonwealth developments”, n 138 above, at 157, and de la Bastide, n 163 above, at 226. 
 57 
apposite to recall the advice of Lord Nicholls in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd regarding declaratory 
relief in public law that the best approach is probably “never say never”.249  
 
 
                                                     
249 [2005] 2 AC 680 at 699: “Rigidity in the operation of a legal system is a sign of weakness, not strength. It 
deprives a legal system of necessary elasticity. Far from achieving a constitutionally exemplary result, it can 
produce a legal system unable to function effectively in changing times. ‘Never say never’ is a wise judicial 
precept, in the interest of all citizens of the country.”  The same sentiment was echoed by McLachlin CJ in 
Henry v British Columbia (Attorney General) [2015] 2 SCR 214, at [35]. 
